

compiled by Dominique Arel
Chair of Ukrainian Studies, U of Ottawa
www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca
29 September 2010

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- 11-Zik: Yanukovych Pledges to Diaspora to Declassify KGB Archives on Holodomor
- 12-NYRBlog: Tim Snyder, Who's Afraid of Ukrainian History?
- 13-Human Rights in Ukraine: SBU, Please do not Indimidate the Concierge
- 14-Pressé Kiev and UKL Digest: Holodomor, Euro 2012, Tymoshenko, Gongadze
- 15-Ukrainian Weekly: Circus at the Rada (on Svoboda)
- 16-RFE/RL: Journalist Attacked in Donetsk
- 17-BBC News: 28 MPs Defect from the Tymoshenko Bloc
- 18-Financial Times: Ukraine Gas Peace Threatens to Unravel
- 19-Kyiv Post: Kremlin Wants Ukraine to be Energy Inefficient
- 20-2000: Dmytro Tabachnyk, Spiritual Capitulation of Nationalists [UKL Translation]
- 21-Jamestown Blog: Taras Kuzio, Orange Revolution Erased from School Textbooks
- 22-Segodnya (Kyiv): New Draft Law on Languages in Rada [BBC Translation]
- 23-AP: Demjanjuk Trial Resumes in Germany
- 24-Kyiv Post: Askold Lozynskyi, Objective and Competent Scholars
- 25-Kyiv Post: John-Paul Himka, The Lviv Pogrom of 1941
- 26-NYRB: Tim Snyder, What We Need to Know about the Holocaust
- 27-Tablet: "World Without Nazism" and the Kremlin

Thanks to Walter Derzko, Anne de Tinguy, John-Paul Himka, Andrij Makuch, David Marples, Blair Ruble (Kennan Institute), Gene Shklar, Kateryna Shynkaruk, Tim Snyder, Ostap Skrypnyk, Myron Spolsky, Andreas Umland, and Roman Zurba

#1

For those of you who can read French, an edited volume was just published in Paris on the politics of language in the Russian Empire, Soviet Union, and post-Soviet sphere. Six of the chapters touch on Ukraine (see below) –DA

Cacophonies d'empire

Le gouvernement des langues dans l'Empire russe et l'Union soviétique

par Juliette Cadiot, Dominique Arel, Larissa Zakharova

ISBN : 978-2-271-07031-9

368 pages

Les bâtisseurs de l'Empire de Russie, puis de l'URSS, durent apprendre à gouverner une population multiethnique parlant plus d'une centaine de langues.

Progressivement cette cacophonie fut transformée selon des modalités combinant quête d'assimilation et respect de la diversité linguistique. En se penchant sur l'histoire des régulations linguistiques dans l'ancien espace dominé par la langue russe, cet ouvrage s'intéresse à la construction des États russes et soviétiques, mais aussi aux héritages de cette histoire dans les États issus de l'éclatement de ces empires. Ce livre souligne l'importance des réflexions et tentatives intellectuelles, scientifiques et politiques en provenance de cette partie du monde, expérience qui a permis l'alphabétisation de masse et la transformation par l'introduction de l'écrit d'une population plurilingue.

Des projets souvent radicaux, autant utopiques que modernisateurs, furent portés par des nombreuses élites : « nationalistes » et bolcheviks firent de la langue un outil de transformation sociale et politique essentiel à leurs projets de réformes des sociétés.

Exploitant des archives inédites, cet ouvrage explore les formes d'intervention sur les langues en tant que processus complexes d'interactions entre l'état, les savants et les sociétés.

Chapters dealing with Ukraine:

Dominique Arel et Juliette Cadiot, Cacophonie d'empires. Russes, Soviétiques et leurs héritiers face au multilinguisme

Alexei Miller, Identité et allégeance dans la politique linguistique de l'Empire russe dans les territoires périphériques occidentaux au cours de la seconde moitié du XIX^e siècle

Aleksandr Dmitriev, Langue ukrainienne et projet de science nationale : les étapes d'une légitimation académique (fin des années 1880, début des années 1920)

Juliette Cadiot, A grands pas vers le russe : l'égalité des langues dans les années 1920

Caroline Gauthier, Consensus, différends et obstacles pratiques dans l'organisation de l'enseignement primaire en ukrainien et en biélorusse (1920-1927)

Volodymyr Kulyk, Orthographe et identité : le rôle des médias dans l'échec de la réforme orthographique de l'ukrainien de 2001

#2

Sixth Annual Danyliw Research Seminar on Contemporary Ukraine

The Chair of Ukrainian Studies is proud to announce the program of its marquee annual event— the 2010 Danyliw Seminar on Contemporary Ukraine. The program is attached to this message and can also be downloaded from the Chair of Ukrainian Studies website at www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca.

The Seminar will feature 17 presentations and bring together 32 scholars from Ukraine, Western Europe, Japan, the United States and Canada. The largest section, with eight papers, is devoted to the contested memory of wars (World War II, Afghanistan) and of the Holodomor. Other sections will touch on political economy, identity and migration, identity and the arts, as well as civil society and "Europe". Special events include a book launch (*Modernism in Kyiv*, U of Toronto Press, 2010), by Irena Makaryk and Virlana Tkacz, and a lecture by Yuri Scherbak, former Ambassador of Ukraine to Canada, on the current political situation in Ukraine.

This will be our most international roster to date, with twelve panelists travelling from overseas, and also our youngest, with ten doctoral students and two freshly minted PhDs among the presenters. The Seminar will thereby introduce a whole new cohort of researchers to Ukrainian studies.

The Seminar runs over three days:

Thursday, October 28, at 1.00-6.00 PM (Desmarais 12102)

Friday 9.00 AM-6.00 PM (The Lounge, New Residence, 90 University Private), and

Saturday 10.00 AM-5.30 PM (also in The Lounge).

The Thursday sessions are thus in a different location than on Friday and Saturday.

An opening reception will be held Thursday, October 28, at 6.15 PM (Desmarais 12110), following the book launch, in Desmarais 12102.

Since seating is limited, people interested in attending the Seminar must register by email (chairukr@gmail.com) or phone (613 562 5800 ext. 3692) as soon as possible. Registration is free.

We very much look forward to seeing you at the Seminar!

Cordially, Dominique Arel
Chair of Ukrainian Studies

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Sixth Annual Danyliw Research Seminar on Contemporary Ukraine

Chair of Ukrainian Studies
University of Ottawa
28-30 October 2010

PROGRAM

Sponsored by
the Wolodymyr George Danyliw Foundation

The Chair also thanks
l'École d'Études Politiques/School of Political Studies
the Faculty of Social Sciences
the Faculty of Graduate and Postgraduate Studies
the UCPBA Ottawa Chapter
for their support

Thursday 28 October

Desmarais Building, 55 Laurier Ave. East
Room 12102 (12th Floor)

1.00-3.00 PM

Session I—Civil Society and “Europe”

Christine Emeran (New School U, US, emerc095@newschool.edu)

Civic Campaigns in the 2004 Presidential Elections

Discussant: Ioulia Shukan (SciencesPo, Paris, France, ioulia.shukan@gmail.com)

Daria Orlova (U Kyiv Mohyla Academy, Ukraine, dasha.orlova@gmail.com)

The Representation of Europe in the Public Discourse of Ukrainian Elites

Discussant: Magdalena Dembinska (U de Montréal, Canada,
magdalena.dembinska@umontreal.ca)

3.30-6.00 PM

Session II—Identity and the Arts

Janice Keefer Kulyk (Writer, Toronto, Canada, janice.keefer@gmail.com)

Natalka Husar (Painter, Toronto, Canada, husar.chown@sympatico.ca)

The Memory of Politics: A Collaborative Take on Post-Orange Revolution Ukraine

Irena Makaryk (U of Ottawa, Canada, makaryk@uottawa.ca)

Virlana Tkacz (Yara Arts Group, New York, US, yara@prodigy.net)

Book Launch and Multimedia Presentation:

Modernism in Kyiv: Jubilant Experimentation (U of Toronto Press, 2010)

6.15-7.15 PM

Opening Reception

Location TBA

Friday 29 October

DIFFERENT LOCATION

The Lounge, New Residence

90 University Private

9.00-11.00 AM

Session III—Targeting Civilians in World War II

Marc Stegherr (Ludwig-Maximilians-U, Germany, marcstegherr@hotmail.com)

Ukrainian Prisoners in Dachau

Discussant: Olena Petrenko (Ruhr U, Bochum, Germany, olena.petrenko@yahoo.de)

Raz Segal (Clark U Strassler Center, Worcester, US, raz.segal@gmail.com)

The Persecution and Destruction of Subcarpathian Rus Jews during World War II

Discussant: Jessica Allina-Pisano (U of Ottawa, Canada, jallinap@uottawa.ca)

11.00 AM-Noon

Session IV—Contention and Commemoration of the War Experience

Iryna Sklokina (Kazarin Kharkiv National U, Ukraine, rebrova.iryana@gmail.com)

The Politics of Memory of Nazi Occupation in Soviet Museums

Discussant: James Casteel (Carleton U, Canada, james_casteel@carleton.ca)

[Noon-1.30 PM Lunch Break]

1.30-3.30 PM

Session IV (continued)

Volodymyr Ishchenko (U Kyiv Mohyla Academy, Ukraine, jerzy.wolf@gmail.com)

Fighting Fences vs Fighting Monuments:

Politics of Memory and Protest Mobilization in Ukraine

Discussant: Ivan Katchanovski (U of Ottawa, Canada, ivan.katchanovski@utoronto.ca)

Anna Colin Lebedev (EHESS, Paris, France, anna_lebedev@yahoo.com)

The Ukrainian Union of Afghanistan War Veterans:

Composing with the Memory of an Illegitimate Soviet War in Contemporary Ukraine

Discussant: David Mendeloff (Carleton U, Canada, dmendelo@ccs.carleton.ca)

4.00-6.00 PM

Session V—Ukraine since Yushchenko

Timothy Colton (Harvard U, US, tcolton@fas.harvard.edu)

Thinking the Unthinkable: Is the Breakup of the Ukrainian State a Real Threat?

Discussant: Adrian Karatnycky (Atlantic Council of the US, akaratnycky@gmail.com)

Yuri Scherbak, former Ambassador of Ukraine to Canada (Kyiv, Ukraine)

Ukraine under Yanukovich

Saturday 30 October

The Lounge, New Residence

90 University Private

10.00 AM-Noon

Session VI—Political Economy

Rachel Wellhausen (MIT, US, rwellhau@mit.edu)

Beyond Expropriation: Variation in Ukraine's Contract Breaches with Foreign Investors

Discussant: Juliet Johnson (McGill U, Canada, juliet.johnson@mcgill.ca)

Monica Eppinger (UC Berkeley, US, monica.eppinger@aya.yale.edu)

Holodomor, Grain Confiscation, and the Contemporary Ukrainian State
Discussant: Maria Popova (McGill U, Canada, maria.popova@mcgill.ca)

[Noon-1.30 PM Lunch Break]

1.00-3.00 PM
Session VI—Holodomor Politics

Olha Ostriitchouk (U Catholique de Louvain, Belgium, olgazazoulia@yahoo.fr)
Holodomor: The Nation-Victim and the Sacred
Discussant: Roman Serbyn (UQAM, Canada, serbyn.roman@videotron.ca)

Dominique Arel (U of Ottawa, Canada, darel@uottawa.ca)
The Historiography of the Holodomor and the Study of Famines
Discussant: Yevgenyi Finkel (U of Wisconsin-Madison, US, efinkel@wisc.edu)

[Coffee Break]

3.30-5.30 PM
Session VII—Identity and Migration

Yuko Shimeki (Osaka U, Japan, yukochika@gmail.com)
*Ukrainian Interpretations of "Ridna Mova":
An Analysis of Survey Results of Students in Ukraine*
Discussant: Oxana Shevel (Tufts U, US, oxana.shevel@tufts.edu)

Olena Fedjuk (Central European U, Budapest, Hungary, novyjbox@yahoo.com)
*Migration in the Second Generation: The Strategies and Outcomes of the
Reunification of Ukrainian Migrants' Families in Italy*
Discussant: Ioulia Shukan (SciencesPo, Paris, France, ioulia.shukan@gmail.com)

#3

Colloque

CERI, 4 octobre 2010
9h30 - 19h00
Salle de conférence 56 rue Jacob 75006 Paris
Tél.:+33(0)1 58 71 70 00 Fax:+33(0)1 58 71 70 90

Ukraine : présidence Ianoukovitch
Retour en arrière ou étape du processus de transition ?

9 h 30 – 12 h 30
Ruptures politiques et attitudes de la société

Présidence : Anne de Tinguy, INALCO et Sciences Po CERI

Dominique Arel, Chaire d'Etudes ukrainiennes, Université d'Ottawa – Culture régionale et culture légale six ans après la révolution orange

Ioulia Shukan, Sciences Po, Paris et Lille – Coalition gouvernementale et opposition(s) : le fonctionnement du système politique sous la présidence Ianoukovitch

Oksana Mikheeva, Université de Donetsk – Attitudes et comportements politiques de la société ukrainienne

Pause café

Annie Daubenton, journaliste et chercheur indépendant, auteur de *Ukraine : les métamorphoses de l'indépendance* (2009) - « Les élites intermédiaires et leur rôle dans la transformation de l'Etat »

Arnaud Dubien, IRIS et Eurasia Intelligence Report, Paris – Les oligarques et le nouveau pouvoir

14 h – 19 h

L'économie ukrainienne : de fortes tensions

Présidence : Jérôme Sgard, Sciences Po CERI

Anna Dorbec, Paris, BNP Paribas – Après la crise, quelle trajectoire pour l'économie ukrainienne ?

Marc-Antoine Eyl-Mazzega, Sciences Po CERI – Les politiques énergétiques de l'Ukraine, enjeux pour la stabilité extérieure et la transformation intérieure : des choix sous influence

Pause café

Un tournant géopolitique ?

Présidence : Jacques Rupnik, Sciences po CERI

Andriy Portnov, rédacteur en chef de *Oukraïna Moderna*, Kiev – Les débats historiques de l'Ukraine postsoviétique : des enjeux identitaires

Anne de Tinguy, INALCO et Sciences po CERI – Le rapprochement avec la Russie : un point de non-retour est-il atteint ?

Emmanuelle Armandon, INALCO – La politique de l'Ukraine à l'égard de ses nouveaux voisins : le cas de la Pologne et de la Roumanie (2004-2009)

Anais Marin, Helsinki, FIIA – Les euro-régions d'Ukraine : enjeux de la coopération transfrontalière

Langues de travail : français et ukrainien (avec interprétation)

#4

Firtash Donates \$6.7 Million to Cambridge Ukrainian Studies

by Olesia Oleshko

Kyiv Post, 24 September 2010

The University of Cambridge in the United Kingdom has launched a permanent program in Ukrainian studies, mostly courtesy of Ukrainian gas-trading billionaire Dmytro Firtash, a co-owner of the controversial RosUkrEnergo gas-trading intermediary.

Firtash gave the school \$6.7 million. The money will allow the schools to develop curriculum, do public events and establish two permanent academic posts – a lecturer in Ukrainian studies and lector in Ukrainian language.

Firtash invited professors to Kyiv to sign an official agreement. "It couldn't have happened if not for Mr. Firtash' generous support," Simon Franklin, professor of Slavonic studies said. Franklin and his colleagues – Rory Finnin, head of Cambridge Ukrainian Studies and Emma Widdis, head of Department of Slavonic Studies presented the program in Kyiv on Sept. 24.

"Ukrainian studies are well represented in American and Canadian schools, while in Western European Universities, such programs are scarce," Franklin said. He explains it by demographic factors – big Ukrainian diaspora in the United States and Canada lobbied Ukrainian language and history programs at top schools like Harvard, Stanford, Columbia and others. "Not many people in Europe really know what modern Ukraine is," Franklin said. "It's a very sad and dangerous mistake and I think it's time to correct it."

Students can take classes in Ukrainian language and literature, where they will be reading books by Ukrainian authors in their original language, classes on Ukrainian cinema, culture and history of Kyivan Rus.

"Our students do not just learn the language," Widdis said. "They get a better understanding of Ukrainian history and culture."

The Ukrainian studies program already enrolls more than 20 students annually. Finnin, who did research on correlation of culture and national identity in 19th and 20th century Ukraine, said that his students love Ukrainian literature, especially poems by Vasyl Stus and Taras Shevchenko.

While the classes are being taught by British and American faculty, the school is planning to invite Ukrainian scientists, historians, writers and artists to do guest lectures and seminars. The department is not limited to academic programs only. It holds regular art exhibitions and Ukrainian movie nights.

The professors think that they will teach the whole new generation of politicians, public leaders, historians and artists who won't have a distorted idea of what Ukraine is and won't have this stereotypical thinking that Ukraine is a part of Russia.

The University of Cambridge is one of the oldest and most prestigious schools in Europe. It was founded in 1209. The university introduced the Russian studies program at the end of World War II in 1945. The "pilot" Ukrainian Studies program was launched in 2008 as a part of Department of Slavonic Languages.

The classes will start in October, but meanwhile three Cambridge professors came to Ukraine to do the official presentation of the program. They said that they wanted to do so much earlier, but the first step was made two years ago with adding Ukrainian language, history and culture classes to the curriculum.

#5

Stalin's Genocides

Norman M. Naimark

Princeton University Press

Cloth | 2010 | \$26.95 / £18.95 176 pp. | 5 1/2 x 8 1/2

e-Book | 2010 | \$26.95 | ISBN: 978-1-4008-3606-2

Between the early 1930s and his death in 1953, Joseph Stalin had more than a million of his own citizens executed. Millions more fell victim to forced labor, deportation, famine, bloody massacres, and detention and interrogation by Stalin's henchmen. *Stalin's Genocides* is the chilling story of these crimes. The book puts forward the important argument that brutal mass killings under Stalin in the 1930s were indeed acts of genocide and that the Soviet dictator himself was behind them.

Norman Naimark, one of our most respected authorities on the Soviet era, challenges the widely held notion that Stalin's crimes do not constitute genocide, which the United Nations defines as the premeditated killing of a group of people because of their race, religion, or inherent national qualities. In this gripping book, Naimark explains how Stalin became a pitiless mass killer. He looks at the most consequential and harrowing episodes of Stalin's systematic destruction of his own populace--the liquidation and repression of the so-called kulaks, the Ukrainian famine, the purge of nationalities, and the Great Terror--and examines them in light of other genocides in history. In addition, Naimark compares Stalin's crimes with those of the most notorious genocidal killer of them all, Adolf Hitler.

Norman M. Naimark is the Robert and Florence McDonnell Professor of East European Studies at Stanford University. His books include Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe and The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949.

#6

From: Maryna Bazylevych <bazyma01@luther.edu>

Date: Sunday, September 19, 2010 5:05 PM

Subject: **Special Issue of Anthropology of East Europe Review**

I am writing to spread the word about a special issue of Anthropology of East Europe Review that I am co-editing. The issue will address health, healthcare and care work more broadly (practices and ideologies) in post-socialist space. AEER is an open access journal now, and usually has quite rich volumes.

I am attaching a call for papers. It should be an interesting issue on everything that has to do with health and possibly care work more broadly, based on the abstracts that come in. If you know of something who'd be great for this issue, please, extend this invitation!

Call for Papers: The Anthropology of East Europe Review (AEER) is now accepting submissions for the Fall 2010 issue.

The Special Issue section theme for the Fall 2010 issue is "Health and Care Work in Postsocialist Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union."

Deadlines: October 1, 2010 (abstracts due); November 1, 2010 (drafts of selected papers due)

We welcome submissions that tackle health care transformations in postsocialist space. As many Eastern European states and the former Soviet republics move away from the socialized health care models and towards market-based mechanisms (in theory or in practice), the ideologies and practices of health and care work are influenced by these changes. At the same time, critical views of transformations and skepticism about promises of the global economy are abundant.

Contributors are encouraged to submit any relevant research in regards to local perceptions and practices of health and healing, interactions between states, individuals and international flows of ideas, policies, goods and people. We are interested in research that addresses the ways in which care work takes place, professionally and informally, as well as the ways in which health related ideas and products circulate.

Please send in electronic form (preferably MS Word), an abstract of no more than 250 words and a short (one paragraph) biography by October 1 to: anthroeasteuropereview@gmail.com. Those authors selected to submit complete papers (up to 6,000 words) will be asked to do so by November 1.

The Anthropology of East Europe Review (AEER), a publication of the East European Anthropology Group and SOYUZ (the Research Network for Post-socialist Cultural Studies), is a biannual edited journal of scholarship on Eastern Europe, Russia, the Balkans, and Central Asia. Our mission is to showcase fresh, up-to-date research and to help build a community of scholars who focus on the region.

#7

Canadian Foundation For Ukrainian Studies Scholarly Publications Support Program

assists with the publication of scholarly works in Ukrainian Studies
half the cost of publication to a maximum of \$6,500
annual
October 15 application deadline

Purpose

Through its Scholarly Publications Support Program, the Canadian Foundation for Ukrainian Studies provides financial assistance for the publication of scholarly works in the field of Ukrainian Studies.

Amount

Support will be up to a maximum of \$6,500 (CDN), or half the cost of publication — whichever is less. If support is approved, funds are provided directly to the publisher.

Types of publications supported

Support will be given to original books in the field of Ukrainian Studies.
Publication of translations, new textbooks intended for university students, or the

reprinting of works of exceptional scholarly value and need, may be considered. Periodicals will not be considered nor will works of belles lettres.

Works for which support is sought should be characterized by:
scholarly excellence;
usefulness and relevance to scholars and students in the field; and
originality by way of advancing the field of knowledge.

Priority will be given to:
works in the English and French languages;
works of potential use to a broader rather than to a more limited readership;
works dealing with the broad history, culture, society and heritage of Ukraine and Ukrainians generally;
in terms of geographic preference, works relating to Ukraine, the Ukrainian community in Canada, followed by the Ukrainian diaspora.

Who may apply

Support will be given to Canadian scholars and other scholars who publish with Canadian presses. Preference will be given primarily in support of the work of those scholars affiliated with Canadian universities or equivalent Canadian institutions of higher learning.

Applications will be accepted only from the author/originator of the work in question after a commitment to publish from an established academic publisher and a commitment to co-fund has been secured. Applications for support after a publication has appeared in print will not be considered.

Application requirements

Applicants should submit a request pertaining to the Scholarly Publications Program to the Foundation's office by October 15, together with the following supporting documentation:

a letter from the intended publisher stating that the manuscript has been reviewed by competent academic experts and has been recommended for publication;

an estimate of the cost of publication;

a statement detailing the financial contribution to be made by the publisher and other funding agencies (if any) covering hard costs;

a letter or letters from funding agencies (if these are known to the publisher) stating dollar commitment to the project;

anticipated specifications of the finished work (number of pages, press run, etc.) and anticipated date of publication; and

· the manuscript's "preliminary material" (preface, introduction and table of contents).

Credits

Publications made possible by the Foundation's support must carry acknowledgment of that support (including the Foundation's logo) in a manner and place in that publication as is customary.

Author or publisher shall provide CFUS with three (3) complimentary copies of the publication.

Decision

Decisions regarding applications under this program rest with the Foundation's Board of Directors and are final once made.

The Foundation reserves the right not to award any grant in years where none of the submissions meet the criteria or are deemed worthy of support by the review committee.

All submissions should be sent in electronically to: cfus@on.aibn.com to the attention of
CFUS – Scholarly Publications Program

For further information, you may contact the Office at:
416-766-9630 or toll free – 1-877-766-7630
cfus@on.aibn.com

#8

From: "Oleh Kotsyuba (Harvard Univ)" <kotsyuba@fas.harvard.edu>
Date: Sunday, September 26, 2010 4:58 PM
Subject: **New issue of "Krytyka" is now available**

The new issue of journal "Krytyka" (no. 7-8, 2010) is now available for purchase - please follow the link below to find out how you can either subscribe for the journal or purchase a particular issue:

http://krytyka.com/cms/front_content.php?idart=64

Some articles from the new issue are also available for download in PDF format on our web site www.krytyka.com.

The previous issue of "Krytyka" (no. 5-6, 2010), dedicated to Poland's "Two Decades of Freedom," is now also available on our web site www.krytyka.com.

Please find below the table of contents for both issues.

Enjoy Ukraine's finest intellectual magazine,
very best,

Oleh Kotsyuba
- Editor, www.krytyka.com
-

Harassment of Historian Raises Censorship Fears

by Natalia A. Feduschak

Kyiv Post, 16 September 2010

Leading international academics have protested the detention of Ukrainian historian Ruslan Zabilii by the State Security Services.

LVIV, Ukraine – Leading international academics have protested the detention of Ukrainian historian Ruslan Zabilii, saying the use of the security services to control access to information is a politicized throwback to Ukraine’s repressive Soviet past.

More than 100 leading historians from around the globe issued an open letter to Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) on Sept. 15, decrying their colleague’s detention on Sept. 8 and calling on the government in Kyiv not to restrict access to archives.

“Whether we share Ruslan Zabilii’s views or not, we consider it absolutely impermissible for a security service to harass researchers and obstruct intellectual activities,” reads the petition, signed by academics from the United States, Europe, Canada, Israel and Ukraine.

“Even while we abhor the politicization of history that has become so evident in the recent years of Orange versus anti-Orange debates, we believe that the resolution of scholarly disputes depends upon the free flow of ideas, and free access to historical sources no matter how controversial they may be.”

In a statement issued by its press department on Sept. 15, the SBU said it remained committed to renewing historic truths and any discussions about “rolling back work in this direction and ‘harassment’ of historians deceive Ukrainian citizens and the international community.”

Tarik Cyril Amar, a leading scholar on Ukraine who headed Lviv’s Center for Urban History of East Central Europe and is now an assistant professor at Columbia University in New York, said historians were compelled to defend Zabilii, even if they did not agree with his conclusions.

“A general consensus among the signatories is that this is a matter of academic freedom and, in my personal opinion, also strongly implies issues of freedom of speech,” he said.

Zabilii, a historian who heads Lviv’s National Memorial Museum of Victims of the Occupation Regimes (“Tyurma na Lonskoho”), was detained in Kyiv on the morning of Sept. 8 in Kyiv by six SBU officers. He was held for 14 hours and his computer and two external hard drives were confiscated. The SBU claimed the historian had illegally gathered materials containing state secrets and was planning to pass it on to other people.

The following day the service opened a criminal probe against Zabilii; on Sept. 13-14, SBU officers in Lviv searched the museum, which is located on the secret service’s premises, and removed other computers to determine if secret information was stored there.

Zabilyi told the Kyiv Post the only information he had related to his research on the guerilla Ukrainian Insurgent Army, known as UPA, and Ukraine's independence movement in the 1940s and 1950s. "These are documents that have been open to historians since 1991, and those that became public in 2008-2009," he said. It remains unclear what the SBU wants to achieve by detaining Zabilyi, but colleagues said it is the manifestation of the debate over Ukrainian history that ignited under former President Victor Yushchenko.

In the last years of his presidency, Yushchenko decreed that secret documents in Ukraine's archives be declassified.

Scholars were granted access to decades-old documents that fell under the jurisdiction of the security services, whose predecessor was the Soviet KGB.

Many of these archives dealt with Ukraine's 1932-1933 Holodomor, the Stalin-ordered famine that killed millions of Ukraine, as well as the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), a political group which accepted using violence as a means of achieving its goal of an independent Ukrainian state, and UPA, its military wing.

While scholars said they welcomed the opening of the archives under Yushchenko, they also said the SBU shouldn't play a central role in this academic research.

"The interference of the SBU in humanitarian sciences transforms it into a secret police, which determines what is a correct and what is a wrong interpretation of these or those historical events," Vasyl Rasevych, a senior research fellow at the Institute of Ukrainian Studies at National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, wrote on Zaxid.net, a western Ukrainian website.

President Viktor Yanukovych has already signalled that he has a different view of Ukrainian history – one that more closely resembles the Kremlin's view that UPA members were Nazi collaborators and that the Holodomor was not a genocide.

"The Yanukovych government does something that the Yushchenko government never did – it uses intimidation to enforce its historical politics. This is qualitatively different, a violation of democracy, a descent into authoritarianism," said John-Paul Himka, a professor from the University of Alberta.

Historians said Ukraine needs to keep the doors to its archives open, a process which has ground to a halt under the new government.

"A free society requires an honest conversation about its past, which is only possible when access to archives is allowed," said Timothy Snyder, a renowned history professor from Yale University whose has written extensively on Eastern Europe. "To present Soviet history as a matter of state secrets is to repeat Soviet practices rather than allowing the learning from the past that will help Ukrainians decide their own future."

If anything, the Yanukovych government hurts itself internationally by detaining historians and closing archives.

"Arresting Zabilyi or any scholar on the basis of their beliefs is not only wrong, it is also a serious tactical error of a government desperately in need of European and

international support," said Jeffrey Burds, Associate Professor of Russian and Soviet History at Boston's Northeastern University.

"Impeding systematic and unfettered access to Ukrainian archives will only serve to bolster the opposition and undermine Ukrainian interests internationally."

#10

From: "Zurba, Roman" <Roman.Zurba@CIBC.com>
Date: Wednesday, September 15, 2010 8:09 AM
Subject: **Zabilyi - Interview with Subtitles**

Interview posted to YouTube of an interview with historian Ruslan Zabilyi. The interview is in Ukrainian, but the following clip does have English subtitles and an interactive script:

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vzxBkpa9ZEA> [part 1]
[no English subtitles for part II as yet]

Interview [part 2] in Ukrainian with no subtitles:
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WZO32HCmThg&feature=channel>

#11

Yanukovych Pledges to Diaspora to Declassify KGB Archives on Holodomor

Zik, 21 September 2010

Pres Viktor Yanukovych opts for declassifying materials related to the 1932-1933 Holodomor in Ukraine, runs his letter sent to the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, a major organization of the US Ukrainian diaspora, TCH reports Sept. 20.

"When I'm told that I deny the Holodomor, I respond by declassifying archives on the famine and transfer them to the Institute of National Memory where historians can examine them unobstructed," the incumbent assured.

Yanukovych also stressed he stopped the pressure by SBU on the employees of the Lontsky St. Prison memorial museum of the victims of political repression in Ukraine. "I have always reacted to accusations with deeds. When I was told that SBU is allegedly persecuting the museum's historians, I instructed the cabinet to immediately transfer the museum from SBU jurisdiction to the Institute of National Memory. I have instructed to add museum's funding in 2011 to those of the INM," the president stressed.

Yanukovych also assured the diaspora that he observes the freedom of the press, saying that, to enhance the freedom, the cabinet is working to introduce public television in Ukraine.

"By the way, the project development is almost completed, and we will approve its concept at the next session of the humanitarian board," the president added. Yanukovych also told the diaspora that everything is being done to ensure fair

and transparent local elections in Ukraine.

He called on the diaspora to enliven the dialog. "We have to talk the language of Ukrainian national interests with you. I hope it will be so. I hope we can reach an understanding as I am convinced that you wish well to Ukraine. We are all for a blossoming and wealthy Ukraine respected by the world," the letter runs.

Recall that Apr. 27, 2010 Yanukovich spoke at a PACE session in Strasburg against the recognition of the Holodomor as a genocide of Ukrainians, saying it was a common tragedy of FSU states and one of the crimes of the Stalin regime. Soon after accession to office, the site on Holodomor was edited out on the presidential site. Recently, however, the site has been reopened.

#12

Who's Afraid of Ukrainian History?

by Timothy Snyder

NYR Blog, 21 September 2010

On summer evenings, the people of the west Ukrainian city Lviv come to sing: under the statue of Taras Shevchenko, the great poet who prophesied Ukrainian independence in the nineteenth century, on the street that was renamed Liberty Boulevard when Ukraine emerged from Soviet rule in 1991. The songs tell of beautiful dark-eyed girls pining for brave soldiers. In one song, young men must leave their homes to fight for freedom as partisans; in the next, they are overwhelmed and killed by Soviet forces. One of the more bellicose songs ends "We'll cry out 'Glory, glory, glory' until the earth shakes," accompanied by the stamping of feet on the cobblestones. These passionate Ukrainian laments overlook the fact that Lviv was once Polish Lwów, and before that Habsburg Lemberg. Well into the twentieth century it was a Polish-Jewish city. During World War II the Germans killed the Jews and the Soviets expelled the Poles, leaving the city to be resettled by Ukrainians from the countryside as it was annexed to an expanded Soviet Ukraine. Ukrainian nationalists, some of whom played a part in the elimination of Jews or Poles, fought desperately and courageously against Soviet rule. The songs celebrating them forget the people who used to live in Lviv, and the part the Ukrainian nationalists played in their removal.

This version of Ukrainian history, flawed though it is, was until recently part of a national conversation about the past. Now Ukrainian historians who draw attention to Ukrainian national resistance to Soviet rule find themselves under pressure from the state. On September 8, the Security Service (SB), under new leadership appointed by the Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich, shut down a museum in Lviv devoted to the occupation of Ukraine by the Nazis and the Soviets. The SB also arrested the museum's director, a young historian named Ruslan Zabilyi, on charges of intending to pass state secrets to foreigners. On September 13 and 14, SB agents searched the offices of the museum's research staff, confiscating two laptops containing archival documents for a planned exhibition on Ukrainian resistance to Soviet rule. While the particulars of the case are murky, it is clear that the story goes beyond the fate of one historian. Under Yanukovich, Ukraine's new memory engineers are using force.

Ukraine is less a country than a concentrated expression of the worst of the European twentieth century, a place where the realization of both Stalinism and National Socialism left behind killing fields of all sorts, multiple terrains of forgetting, full of pitfalls. The last president of Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko, tried without success to elevate the west Ukrainian myth of suffering and resistance to pan-Ukrainian history, canonizing the nationalist **Stepan Bandera** as a Hero of Ukraine. His successor Yanukhovich represents a part of Ukraine united by another kind of oblivion. Southeastern Ukraine was industrialized after a famine orchestrated by Stalin killed about three million Ukrainians. While Ukrainians in the west tend to forget the Poles and the Jews, inhabitants of the southeast forget the starved Ukrainians whose lands were sometimes taken by their parents or grandparents. In eastern Ukraine, service in the Red Army during World War II is generally considered heroic, and the nationalists who resisted the expansion of Soviet power to western Ukraine are seen as outsiders or criminals. Forgotten are the crimes committed by the Red Army itself.

In independent Ukraine, the SB has been charged with organizing some of the selective remembrance. In an ill-considered move, Yushchenko extended the purview of the SB to include oversight of national memory policy, including control of some museums. Thus the SB took an active part, in the last weeks of Yushchenko's rule this last winter, in a "trial" that found Stalin and others guilty of genocide during the famine. It also permitted a former Soviet prison in Lviv to become a museum of the occupation of Ukraine by the Nazis and the Soviets. The museum is dedicated to a version of history similar to that of the laments in Lviv: it presented Ukraine as the homeland of Ukrainians, fighting heroically against both Soviet and German occupation. Yanukhovich, who has taken a much more forgiving approach to Stalinism than his predecessor, began his presidency by denying that the famine was genocide. The Lviv prison that became a museum is now, ironically, the site of the arrest of a historian. According to the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union, Zabilyi was seized on the street by six plainclothes SB operatives, held without a warrant or an arrest order, interrogated for fourteen hours, and forced to surrender his computer and external hard drives. Though Ukrainian law is confusing on these issues, the basic case against Zabilyi seems to be that he was intending to transmit documents from archives to foreigners.

That, of course, is what historians do. We read documents in archives, we interpret them, and we communicate our findings. An honest conversation about the past requires discussion informed by documents; in Ukraine, the site of famine, terror, and Holocaust, such discussion is more pressing than elsewhere. Under Yushchenko and his two predecessors, a certain regional pluralism meant that discussion was always taking place. From the differences of opinion between west and east arose, at times, real hope for a common Ukrainian history, in which each side might address some of the oversights of the other. Now Yanukhovich is suppressing one variant of history, which can only mean the enforcement of his own orthodoxy.

But even more fundamentally: arresting Ukrainian historians for using Soviet-era documents is a radical change for the worse. It makes the Soviet past, and in particular the history of Stalinist repression of Ukrainians, appear to be a state secret. The SB has muddied the waters by presenting Zabilyi as their own employee, which is true because the SB had authority over the museum, but this is irrelevant. It is possible that he was chosen for the first arrest in a campaign because the SB command is aware that a historian working at a museum that emphasizes west Ukrainian nationalist resistance will seem unappealing to international observers.

Thus when the international protests come, Kiev could well respond, in good Soviet style, by presenting Zabilyi as a nationalist reactionary. But the fundamental point transcends the individual. If one historian can be arrested for using documents, then others can be too. If the protest does not come, then others will be arrested. Much of what we have learned about both Stalinist repression and the Holocaust in the past twenty years has come from Ukrainian archives. The intimidation of historians is a threat not just to civic life in Ukraine, but to the advance of our knowledge of the recent past.

#13

Head of IMI asks Security Service to not Intimidate her Concierge

by Victoria Syumar

Human Rights in Ukraine, 24 September 2010

[Originally published in Ukrainian on Ukrainska pravda, 24 September 2010]

Victoria Syumar, Director of the Institute for Mass Information, has publicly asked the SBU [Security Service] to stop scaring the concierge of the block of apartments where she lives.

Her text in full:

Request to the SBU: Don't frighten the concierge

Even against the background of regular information about the "active" behaviour of Ukraine's Security Service regarding "prophylactic conversations", my terrified concierge was unexpected. She quietly recounted how SBU officers had come to her and asked her about the people living in my flat. The main questions were: how they live, when they come in, who visits the flat, etc.

Quite honestly, at such behaviour from people who are supposed to ensure my country's national security, you want to laugh. They could have asked me any of those questions. I'm ready to answer them. My telephone is entirely accessible. And Google in the modern world is also capable of providing more information than my concierge.

I am sorry that our domestic "JamesBonds" are wasting time on such "information gathering" about civic activists, journalists, historians, wasting time on specific "talks" with university rectors, recipients of grants from the International Renaissance Foundation, and so forth.

I am sorry that "the grandiose tasks" of restoring the authority of the Ukrainian Security Service, turning it into the "new KGB", or at least the FSB, look so feeble. And those setting such a course in just that matter are in no way similar to Vladimir Putin, although clearly they'd like to repeat his career success.

It's now time to put the question: who in reality is harming national security: activists, journalists and historians who are simply doing their jobs, or people who issue the order to detain the Director of a German Foundation on the eve of the President's trip to Germany, to have "talks" with Renaissance Foundation grant receivers before the visit of the US Deputy Secretary of State, or to interrogate a blogger, provoking millions of unpleasant notes on the Internet?

I am sorry for those who have to carry out such orders, sorry for the Press Secretary who has to constantly report that the "incident is closed", and look for some more or less comprehensible explanation for these overt blunders.

Is it not perhaps time to place in question the professional worth of people who should be dealing with serious matters and not playing banal children's games based on personal psychological complexes? This is a rhetorical question for those who are still publicly explaining that the main offices on Volodymyrska St (SBU headquarters) are occupied by "top professionals in their business".

#14

Presse Kiev (French Embassy) and UKL Digest

25 August-23 September 2010

UKL450 (24 August 2010) reproduced an incorrect item from the recent issue of the Kyiv Mohyla Foundation of America electronic newsletter according to which Serhiy Kudelia had been appointed Chair of the Political Science Department at the University Kyiv Mohyla Academy. The appointment is in fact still pending, as Professor Kudelia promptly informed us on 24 August. -UKL

Holodomor. The Ukrainian Canadian Congress announced in a press release on 21 September that the section on the Holodomor "had been returned to the official website of the President of Ukraine". Ivan Katchanovski, however, pointed out on Facebook on 23 September that most almost all the information on the Holodomor had been removed. (The actual 2006 law, as well as various resolutions worldwide, declaring the Holodomor to have been a "genocide", are still posted). In the FB discussion that followed, Oxana Shevel wrote that "one of the content of the old page is in fact still on the president's website and can be accessed by following links from the old page is in the google cache" and "can't see any obvious rhyme or reason as to what they kept and what they removed." She is "still inclined to think that they are having a hard time deciding what take to take, so to speak" (23 September, from UKL).

Euro 2012. The weekly newsletter *Democracy Watch* (No. 6) writes that "the total cost of the recent World Cup in South Africa according to official government information was \$4.5 billion, \$1.5 billion of which was spent on the reconstruction of 10 stadiums, five of which were brand new. According to the most recent figures the Ukrainian government plans to spend approximately \$6.4 billion on organising half of Euro 2012. One might well ask why Euro 2012 which is a smaller competition than the World Cup is costing in total three times more particularly when two of the stadiums in Donetsk and Kharkiv have been privately funded." The newsletter adds: "In Ukraine nobody utters a word [about this] and the government goes cap in hand to the IMF and World Bank for loans to fuel this extravagance" (20 September, from UKL)

Tymoshenko Bloc. Twenty-eight MPs were expelled from the Bloc due to their decision to join the ruling coalition (Party of Regions-Lytvyn Bloc-Communist Party). They want to create an independent parliamentary group (*Ukraina moloda*). This new group, "Reforms for the Future" would like to be recognized as a fraction, which would give a certain number of rights to these MPs and more weight in the Rada (*Kommersant*). The Tymoshenko Bloc recalls that one must get 3% of the vote in

elections in order to be recognized as a full-fledged fraction, and the Party of Regions is in no hurry to support the creation of this new group. Meanwhile, *Gazeta po-kievski* cites a Russian politologist who fears that the Rada might become, as with the Duma in Russia, "a forum not made for discussion", in the famous words of the Duma speaker Borys Gryzlov (23 September). *Den* writes that in Kyiv and Lviv oblasts certain lists call themselves "Batkivshchyna" [the name of Tymoshenko's party --UKL], even though their candidates were expelled from the party. The real candidates proposed by Tymoshenko were unable to get registered and the Tymoshenko Bloc has called for a boycott of the elections in these oblasts (22 September, translated from Presse Kiev).

Gongadze. On the eve of the 10th anniversary of the disappearance of journalist Georgyi Gongadze, the Prosecutor General of Ukraine announced the closure of the preparatory instruction in the affair of General Pukach, accused of murdering the journalist. For the Prosecutor, former Minister of the Interior Kravchenko, who died in 2005, is the only one who ordered the murder (*Ukraina moloda*). *Ukrains'ka pravda* cites the depositions of Pukach in which the name of Volodymyr Lytvyn, the Rada Speaker, appears. *Segodnya* notes that his name is not listed in the accusation of the Prosecutor. *Gazeta po-ukraïnskii* cites the MP of Our Ukraine, Hennadii Moskal, who declares that the accusations by the Prosecutor against Kravchenko, based on the testimony of Pukach, are not credible: "It was a political decision, and Kravchenko became the scapegoat." *Gazeta po-kievskii* has the headline: "The dead one is guilty." Ten years after the murder of Gongadze, his body has still not been buried and those responsible for the crime remain unpunished. According to *Gazeta po-kievskii*, the Gongadze affair is an example of the amorality, impunity and arbitrariness ruling in Ukraine (15 September, from Presse Kiev).

Hassidim in Uman. The pilgrimage of Hassidic Jews in Uman concluded with fights and attacks with knives. City policemen would not refuse a more important help from Israeli colleagues, who were only four this year (*Segodnya*, from Presse Kiev).

Independence Day. The newspapers report on the festivities of the 19th anniversary of Ukrainian independence. For *Segodnya*, the holiday was more sober than in the Yushchenko years, and even more sober than for the May 9th celebration, which is now the most important holiday for the population of Ukraine (25 August, from Presse Kiev).

Amendments to the Electoral Law. *Segodnya* believes that the motives behind these changes [which were adopted by the Rada on 30 August] were tactical, as they would allow most the branches of the parties of Tyhypko, Yatseniuk and Hrytsenko to take part in the elections. The daily explains that these parties will take votes away from Tymoshenko and that their participation will thus be favorable to the Party of Regions (25 August, from Presse Kiev).

#15

Circus at the Rada

Zenon Zawada Kyiv Bureau Editor
The Ukrainian Weekly, 9 September 2010

The latest opposition protest at the Verkhovna Rada, on September 7, resembled a three-ring circus that revealed the increasing radicalization and tension in Ukrainian

politics, which appears to be poised for a nasty eruption as predicted by numerous observers.

About 10,000 demonstrators (I estimate about 2,500 pro-government and 7,500 opposition) arrived from throughout Ukraine, despite extensive efforts by the police to prevent the arrival of demonstrators. Any bus companies found to be transporting opposition protestors automatically have their transportation license confiscated. All the dozen or so protestors I spoke with today either arrived by train or their own cars. They all said bus companies declined to transport them.

Only three parties were represented at the protest: Batkivschyna (led by Yulia Tymoshenko), the Svoboda nationalists (led by Oleh Tiahnybok) and the People's Rukh of Ukraine (Narodnyi Rukh) led by Borys Tarasyuk. Viktor Yushchenko has vanished from the Ukrainian political scene and Our Ukraine is extinct, as well as the orange color, which Ukrainians now associate with the Donetsk Shakhtar soccer team more than anything else.

Previous protests were marred by Svoboda nationalists shouting down more moderate voices, who yelled "Tiah-ny-bok!" even as prominent leaders such as Tymoshenko spoke. It was no different this time around. The protest meeting was marred by hundreds of radicalized Svoboda youths in their 20s attempting to shout down most other speakers, including Borys Tarasyuk and former police chief Yuri Lutsenko.

Lutsenko is not a popular figure in Ukrainian politics, having been among those who most betrayed the Orange ideals. Yet the fact he was shouted down demonstrates the aggressiveness of Svoboda supporters, who didn't seem to be interested in joining the unification of opposition forces, but causing enmity.

When demonstrators attempted to take away their megaphones, in order to stop them from shouting down other speakers, the Svoboda boys shoved and even punched back, continuing to repeat over and over, "Tiah-ny-bok!" Soon enough, their zombie-like fanaticism for Tiahnybok led other demonstrators to accuse them of either being at the protest for money, as paid provocateurs, or intentionally causing division among the opposition forces at the behest of the Party of Regions.

Indeed many Ukrainian patriots suspect that the Svoboda party engages in ethnically and politically motivated provocations and aggressive behavior in order to benefit the Party of Regions. Today's behavior of the young male supporters, many in their 20s, only contributed to that view.

After the rally, Tiahnybok insisted to those gathered around him (including me) that he didn't spur his supporters into shouting his name or disrupting the rally. He said they were upset because the demonstration's organizers, the Committee to Defend Ukraine, denied him an opportunity to speak. However another party leader, Iryna Farion, was allowed to address the crowd, so the behavior of the Svoboda crowd seemed unreasonable.

Additionally, the Svoboda nationalists appeared as if they came to the rally prepared to attack Tymoshenko (and anyone besides their own leaders, for that matter), having arrived with printed placards with slogans that taunted her, such as "Who made (natural) gas serfs out of Ukrainians?"

In her speech, Tymoshenko hammered on the government's unpopular decisions to increase natural gas prices, increase utility bills by 30 percent, increase the pension age, and increase the Kyiv subway fare (from 22 cents to 25 cents). She also referred to the government as Ukrainophobes, citing its Russification policies.

Farion is among the most radical politicians in Ukraine, so it can as no surprise that she called for "Ukraine for Ukrainians" and ridding the nation of the "animals in government." She used very loaded language, calling upon the protesters "to shoot them up with their voting ballots" at the October 31 elections and speaking of a "final catharsis" that will soon arrive.

Similar language was used by the Committee to Defend Ukraine chairman Dmytro Pavlychko, who said openly that Ukraine "is headed for an explosion." That does seem to be the direction of events as such protests draw more supporters. And the Yanukovych administration does seem to be provoking the opposition into a violent confrontation, with its radically pro-Russian cultural policies that denigrate the dignity of ethnically conscious Ukrainians.

It's apparent the government is even laying the groundwork for such a violent confrontation, which it can use as a pretext to impose a full-scale authoritarianism as evidenced in Belarus and even some form of martial law. If the opposition enters into an "explosion," as Mr. Pavlychko suggested, then it better plan the right strategy to ensure that it emerges as the winner, not the defeated.

The techniques used by the government to deal with the opposition are getting fiercer. While earlier allowing protestors to line up along Hrushevskoho Street on the side opposite of the parliament building, this time they weren't allowed to walk along the street at all. Once again, the government surrounded the parliament building with thousands of Party of Regions supporters, who were comfortably shielded by metal barricades and hundreds of police. Their fanaticism and bizarre behavior is accelerating as fast as the radicalization of the opposition, which was forced to hold its meeting at the Mariyinskiy Palace, adjacent to the parliament building.

It came as no surprise to see more than a thousand Russian Orthodox radicals marching in columns around the parliament building, holding icons and wooden crosses and singing Church Slavonic hymns. This has been a common sight at the barricades that have surrounded the parliament at protests since Yanukovych came to power.

I should note that never was religion integrated into political activity to such an extent as the Yanukovych administration is currently exploiting it. The Orange forces never invoked religion during their reign in the government or their role in the opposition. This leads to the conclusion that the Party of Regions is truly fearful of the opposition and has resorted to extreme measures to extend their grip on power, such as manipulating the Orthodox devoted into defending their authoritarian rule.

It shocked me to see hundreds of Party of Regions supporters participating in a Divine Liturgy ceremony led by Orthodox priests within their barricaded fortress, directly in front of the parliament building just as the opposition was meeting. I had never seen such a direct infusion of religion in politics, which has very dangerous potential because it introduces a new irrational element to the conflict. Politics is

supposed to offer rational, compromised solutions to disputes. Religion is irrational and therefore can lead people to do highly irrational things.

The scene inside the parliament was just as bizarre as about a dozen deputies of the Tymoshenko Bloc led a blockade of the podium. Yet the pro-Russian coalition was voting on and approving legislation during this "blockade," rendering it wholly ineffective and largely a ploy for television cameras.

The most hopeful sign is that the opposition forces are swelling and gaining support among the population. Today's anti-government protest was the largest since the Yanukovich administration took power.

Yet it was very disheartening to see the opposition forces so divided. (What else is new?) It seems as though Ukrainians are incapable of uniting, no matter how compelling the conditions might be. While I once reserved sympathy and admiration for the Svoboda nationalists and their fierce devotion to the Ukrainian cause, I lost much sympathy and respect for them after today's protest. They demonstrated such unconstructive narrow-mindedness and hostility towards the other opposition parties that I'm starting to believe they're more of a hindrance than a benefit to the Ukrainian cause. Their radical positions on many issues aren't capable of unifying the country, and play into the hands of the Party of Regions in reinforcing the Soviet stereotype of western Ukrainians as "fascist," hostile, intolerant and dangerous.

The consensus is that Yanukovich and the Party of Regions are seeking the same authority in Ukraine that Putin enjoys in Russia and Lukashenko in Belarus. They will tighten the screws of their authoritarian rule following the October 31 elections, which will no doubt be falsified and rigged in many cities. The amended election law approved on August 30 only enhances the government's ability to falsify the vote, as detailed in The Ukrainian Weekly last week.

The latest episode in the Yanukovich nightmare is the September 7 announcement by Yevhen Bystrytskyi, the executive director of the Renaissance Foundation in Ukraine, that the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) is reviewing its work in Kyiv. While George Soros is no angel and no one to be admired, the Renaissance Foundation offers much support to many of Ukraine's democracy-building institutions. As we recall, Vladimir Putin supported legislation in the Russian Duma in 2006 limiting the ability of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to operate in Russia. No doubt, Yanukovich would also like to restrict the presence western NGOs which offer financial support to organizations committed to democracy-building and Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration. The Renaissance projects targeted by the SBU so far are not political, yet it's clearly the strategy of the current government to slowly and gradually eliminate the Western presence. If the Renaissance Fund is strangled, so go many Ukrainian NGOs.

#16

Concerns Mount About Press Freedom In Ukraine As Journalist Attacked

by Olha Dorovskykh

RFE/RL.org, 21 September 2010

DONETSK, Ukraine -- A journalist says he was severely beaten up by police in the city of Donetsk, fueling concerns about press freedom in Ukraine under President Viktor Yanukovich.

Journalist Artyom Furmanyuk says the incident took place on the night of September 17 outside his home following a dispute with a group of strangers. Police deny the allegation, saying Furmanyuk's injuries resulted from a street brawl.

According to Furmanyuk, who runs a news website devoted to exposing crime and corruption in the Donetsk region, police arrived at the scene after one of the strangers telephoned friends working in the police force.

He says the police immediately handcuffed him, his brother Anton Furmanyuk, and their two friends, Yevgenny Demchenko and Roman Samoylov.

"They came up and immediately began handcuffing us, they said they were going to take us to the Kalininskyy district police station," Furmanyuk says. "They put handcuffs on Yevgenny and on my brother, but Roman and I resisted, we asked on what grounds this was happening."

Furmanyuk says the officers pinned him to the ground before kicking him and beating him with truncheons. "I was beaten by three men," he says. "I saw only two, but my brother says there were three. In the end I was screaming with agony, I could no longer bear it."

The journalist claims he was beaten a second time inside the police station.

He suffered broken ribs, a severe eye injury, cuts, and numerous bruises.

His friend Samoylov says police sprayed tear gas into his eyes.

"It all happened very quickly, without any warning. They didn't introduce themselves and didn't show any documents," Samoylov says.

"They immediately put handcuffs on Anton, and Artyom and I protested. I was immediately sprayed with gas. After this I could only hear shouting and swearing, then they started beating us." Samoylov claims the officers also ripped a gold chain off his neck and stole the contents of his wallet.

Furmanyuk and his friends were released without charges.

Police Reject Allegations

The case has set Ukraine's Internet abuzz, with readers leaving angry comments accusing the police of abuse and corruption.

The Donetsk police have firmly denied any wrongdoing and held a news conference today to reject the accusations.

Donetsk police chief Viktor Dubovyk said Furmanyuk sustained his injuries during a street brawl with the group of strangers prior to the police's arrival, and that the officers "resorted to weapons to stop the fight and because people were unlawfully refusing to obey the police officers."

The head of the local police station, Vasyl Horyachev, also told the conference that Furmanyuk was drunk and denied he mentioned being a journalist, sparking a furious reaction from Furmanyuk and his supporters.

Fears For Journalistic Freedom

Although it remains unclear whether the incident was linked to Furmanyuk's journalistic activities, it has raised fresh concerns about media freedom in Ukraine.

Media watchdogs say attacks and pressure on journalists have increased since the February election of Yanukovich as president.

Furmanyuk's alleged beating by the police took place just hours after RFE/RL's Ukrainian Service published an article in which he accused the local authorities and police of widespread corruption.

It is the second attack on a Donetsk journalist in less than a week; the head of the local Union of Professional Journalists, Hennady Berezovskyy, was assaulted on September 12.

"Over the five years of Viktor Yushchenko's tenure, we've lowered our guard. We forgot that the state machine cannot be on the side of journalists and will not defend journalists," says publicist Stanislav Fedorchuk.

"For the authorities, journalists are enemies because they cover public issues and they do so in a professional manner. Journalists are clearly a threat to the regime."

The incident also comes amid mounting concern over the disappearance last month of Vasyl Klymentyev, the editor in chief of the newspaper "Novyy Styl," which focuses on corruption in the country's eastern Kharkiv region.

His deputy editor says Klymentyev, who is now presumed dead, had received threats after refusing to take money to halt the publication of an article accusing a prosecutor of bribe-taking.

The European Union has expressed "deep concern" over his disappearance and urged Yanukovich not to renege on his pledge to uphold media pluralism and protect journalists.

#17

MPs Desert Defeated Ukraine Candidate Yulia Tymoshenko

BBC News, 21 September 2010

Ukraine's parliament has confirmed the migration of 28 MPs from the bloc led by Yulia Tymoshenko, who was defeated in this year's presidential election.

The Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc formally expelled the 28 after reports that they had sided with the coalition formed by President Viktor Yanukovich.

The bloc had won 156 seats at the 2007 polls and Mrs Tymoshenko became prime minister, heading a coalition.

But she lost office in March after a vote of no confidence.

Seven of her own MPs reportedly voted against her on that occasion. Mr Yanukovich won the run-off round of the presidential election in February by 48.95% to 45.47% for Mrs Tymoshenko.

His victory was seen as a boost for pro-Russian forces in Ukraine after disenchantment with the 2004-05 Orange Revolution, which was led by Mrs Tymoshenko and former President Viktor Yushchenko.

New coalition

No official reason was given immediately on Tuesday for the expulsion of the 28 MPs, which was announced by the parliamentary speaker, Volodymyr Lytvyn. However, Ukrainian and Russian media reports said that those expelled had either defected to the new coalition loyal to President Yanukovich, or had been suspected of disloyalty towards Mrs Tymoshenko.

The new coalition which emerged in March under Yanukovich loyalist Mykola Azarov brought together the president's Party of the Regions, the Communist Party and a bloc loyal to Mr Lytvyn.

When it was formed, it had the support of 235 MPs in the 450-seat parliament.

#18

Ukraine Gas Peace Threatens to Unravel

by Roman Olearchyk in Kiev and Neil Buckley in London
Financial Times, 22 September 2010

Just months ago, peace seemed to have broken out in the long gas wars between Ukraine and Russia. Yet as autumn turns chillier, the same volatile mix of factors that has sparked two shut-offs of Russian gas to Ukraine since 2006 is creating at least the chance of a new winter stand-off.

The unravelling of the gas peace is a surprise. While warmer relations had been expected, the speed with which Russia-leaning president Viktor Yanukovich tilted Ukraine back towards Moscow after his February election startled western capitals. Amid a series of economic rapprochements, Mr Yanukovich in April secured a 30 per cent cut in gas prices. In return, he extended by 25 years Russia's lease on a naval base in Crimea – home to its Black Sea fleet.

That followed last year's agreement between Yulia Tymoshenko, then Ukrainian prime minister, and Vladimir Putin, her Russian counterpart, regulating other aspects of the gas relationship. The deal cut out of the supply arrangement RosUkrEnergo, a controversial gas trader, which previously made hundreds of millions of dollars of profit a year from a position as middleman between Russia's Gazprom monopoly and Ukraine.

However, with winter approaching, familiar factors are complicating talks

between Moscow and Kiev: new Ukrainian demands for cheaper prices, Moscow's long desire to take control of the crucial gas export pipeline running across Ukraine and a return to the stage by RosUkrEnergO.

"A clash seems imminent – and not only on the gas issue," says Oleh Rybachuk, a Ukrainian political pundit and former presidential chief of staff. He notes Russia is pushing hard not only for closer gas industry integration but urging Kiev to join an economic union and merge both nations' sizeable aviation and nuclear power industries.

Sergei Kupriyanov, a Gazprom spokesman, said he saw "no basis for a new gas crisis". But Ukraine surprised everyone last month by suggesting it would seek a new price cut.

Even after April's discount, Kiev's ruling coalition now says its \$10bn annual gas bill is too big a burden on its heavy industrial economy. Ukraine is struggling to recover from a 15 per cent plunge in output last year.

In response, Mr Putin hinted this month lower prices might be possible, but only as part of broader economic reintegration.

"Let's form a unified economic space, unify our economic legislation ... and then we can extend our internal [energy] prices to our partners," Mr Putin told foreign journalists.

Along with the price wrangling, RosUkrEnergO – which had been essentially dormant for more than a year – has re-entered the picture.

The Stockholm Arbitration Tribunal, which adjudicates on international business disputes, in June ordered Ukraine to return 11bn cubic metres (bcm) of gas, worth more than \$5bn today, to the trader.

Its Ukrainian part-owners had claimed in a lawsuit the gas was illegally expropriated from it when it lost its supply role in last year's agreement. The Swiss-registered trader is 45 per cent owned by Dmytro Firtash, and 5 per cent by Ivan Fursin, both Ukrainian businessmen; Russia's Gazprom owns the other half. The disputed 11bcm of gas was resold by Gazprom to Naftogaz, the Ukrainian state gas company.

The idea of returning it to RosUkrEnergO is contentious. Ms Tymoshenko, now an opposition leader, has repeatedly claimed the gas trader's Ukrainian shareholders are closely linked to members of Mr Yanukovich's team.

Addressing foreign diplomats in Kiev this month, she alleged the shareholders were associates of Serhiy Lyovochkin, Mr Yanukovich's chief of staff, and Yuriy Boyko, Ukrainian energy minister.

Mr Lyovochkin has admitted being friends with RosUkrEnergO's Mr Firtash and Mr Fursin, but denied being a business partner. Mr Firtash, Mr Fursin and Mr Boyko did not respond to requests for interviews or questions e-mailed to them. Answering questions in front of a parliament investigatory committee this month, Mr Boyko denied having an interest in RosUkrEnergO.

Nonetheless, the energy minister appears to have personal links with Mr Firtash. Documents seen by the FT show Mr Boyko served as Mr Firtash's legal representative in a recent divorce.

Ms Tymoshenko has gone as far as suggesting associates of Mr Yanukovich deliberately presented a weak case to the Stockholm tribunal, so helping RosUkrEnergo to win. The Ukrainian administration adamantly denies this. Transferring \$5bn of gas to the trader would be problematic for other reasons, putting huge pressure on Ukraine's stretched public finances.

Ms Tymoshenko warned the foreign diplomats it could raise questions over Ukraine's ability to repay a \$15.2bn loan from the International Monetary Fund negotiated by Kiev's new government.

An IMF official played down Ms Tymoshenko's warning, saying handing over the gas posed no big financial risks for Ukraine.

But analysts warn losing 11bcm of gas would severely stretch the cash-strapped Naftogaz.

Ultimately, either Ukraine's desire for lower gas prices or a financial squeeze on Naftogaz could be used by Moscow to further its desire to regain control of the trans-Ukraine gas pipeline. That pipeline carries 80 per cent of Russia's lucrative gas exports to western Europe.

In an apparent gambit aimed at that goal, Mr Putin suddenly proposed in May merging Gazprom and Ukraine's Naftogaz, which operates the pipeline.

Additional reporting by Catherine Belton in Moscow

#19

Kremlin Wants Ukraine to be Energy Inefficient

by Natalia Shapovalova

Kyiv Post, 17 September 2010

Natalia Shapovalova is a researcher at FRIDE, a think tank based in Madrid, Spain, <http://www.fride.org/>. Prior to joining FRIDE, she was a researcher at the International Centre for Policy Studies in Kyiv. A longer version of the argument can be found at <http://www.fride.org/publication/810/the-battle-for-ukraine-s-energy-allegiance>

The effects of Ukraine's turn towards Russia are beginning to be seen in the crucial area of energy security. As the main route of Russian gas into Europe, Ukraine is vital to European and Russian energy security.

While the European Union seeks to secure gas supplies by integrating its eastern neighbor in its energy market, Russia is increasingly seeking to prevent EU-led reforms in Ukraine in order to secure stable gas export incomes and continue exerting power over its "sphere of privileged interest."

Ukraine's elite is not interested in reform, but maintaining the status quo is no longer viable. As the country is losing its transit role and the economy is increasingly inefficient, Ukraine is presented with an ever-starker choice between the energy security guarantees of the EU and Russia.

These tensions are coming to a head now. Ukraine has adopted a new law covering the gas sector that harmonizes its legislation with EU gas market regulations and norms.

The EU has indicated that this opens the way for Ukraine to join the European Energy Community – established between the EU and a series of third countries to extend the European internal energy market beyond its borders – which would bring competitiveness and transparency to the country's energy market.

At the same time, the Kremlin has changed its tactics from aggressive supply interruptions to attempting peaceful takeovers of Ukraine's key energy assets.

In April, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin proposed a Gazprom-Naftogaz merger in order to invest in the modernization of Ukraine's gas transit system.

Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich rebutted the proposal and suggested instead a tripartite EU-Ukraine-Russia consortium. Despite Yanukovich's soft "no," Russia continues to look for other ways to gradually edge its way into the Ukrainian gas market.

Russia does not ask for liberalizing reform.

It is interested in controlling transit routes to Europe and in preserving its source of income from gas export. Europe's reduced energy consumption due to the financial crisis and the discovery of shale gas fields in Europe and the U.S. are becoming a threat to Russia. Moscow needs energy inefficient and ineffective Ukraine to remain one of the largest gas consumers in the world and one of Gazprom's largest clients.

For its part, the EU aspires to make the Ukrainian energy market transparent and competitive. From an energy security perspective, if Ukraine is absorbed by Russia, EU dependence on Russia will only increase and it will lose its soft power in the neighborhood.

From a wider foreign policy perspective, Ukraine's energy integration with Russia will entail wider economic integration, weakening the EU's clout over Ukraine and the incentives to reform.

In 2005, the EU and Ukraine signed a memorandum of understanding on energy cooperation. During 2007-2008, the EU allocated 157 million euros to assist energy reform. Additionally, in 2009, the commission pledged its assistance towards the modernization of Ukraine's gas transit system, subject to reform progress in the energy sector.

But the envisaged reforms have not been implemented. Ukraine's energy sector remains ineffective, opaque and corrupt. Despite all the efforts and funding, Ukraine appears to be slipping from the EU's reach. Why does EU policy bear no fruit in Ukraine? First, rent seeking prevails and energy is used as a domestic political weapon.

Energy resources lubricate the wheels of patronage.

Successive governments see no rational motive for change. Second, the EU could use the transformative potential of its accession policy to help Ukraine become an independent and democratic actor, but it has chosen not to.

While energy is a key policy area in EU-Ukraine relations, the EU's energy strategy suffers from the same problem as EU policy towards Ukraine in general: it has no strategic end-goal and insufficient incentives to drive it forward.

What can the EU do about it? In the short term, it can insist on the modernization of the gas transit system and promote energy reform in a more responsible way.

Budget aid or loans will yield no results if they continue without strict conditionality and stringent monitoring of reform results.

The solution to this enormously important policy challenge of Ukraine's energy policy identity must be political in the broadest sense. The EU's current wait-and-see approach can only damage its own energy security.

#20

The Spiritual Capitulation of Nationalists

by Dmytro Tabachnyk

"2000" Weekly, No. 37, 17-23 September 2010

[translated by Kateryna Shynkaruk for UKL]

Dmytro Tabachnyk is the Minister of Education and Science of Ukraine.

Since this February, when initial contours of the acting Ukrainian government became visible, its opponents have written hundreds (if not thousands) of articles and blogs dedicated to the relations between the authorities and opposition. The vast majority of them stated an absolutely obvious thing - the opposition in Ukraine is weak, confused, divided and lacks creativity, its leaders do not enjoy the confidence of the voters, and it is incapable to effectively oppose the authorities. [In bold in the original]

Some of the most professional authors pointed out the main pre-election and post-election mistake of Yulia Tymoshenko, which cost her not only victory at the elections, but also the chance to effectively confront the present government from the opposition niche, once she lost the elections. Yulia Tymoshenko counted on the right nationalist forces, having abandoned general democratic rhetoric.

Whereas even Yushchenko realized in 2004 that "naked" nationalism won't bring him more or less significant popular support and had to mask his prehistoric nature with the "ten first decrees", signed on "Maidan" [Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) where the demonstrations took place - UKL] before his judicial appointment as the president. However, these decrees have never been enacted as after Yushchenko's inauguration he found his own promises "anti-Ukrainian".

Since then, not least because of Yushchenko's reckless policy, whom [Yuri] Andrukhovych [a well-known writer and public intellectual in Ukraine -UKL] called a

"hellish idoloclast", nationalists have noticeably lost voter support. Almost all the parties of the nationalist spectrum are now marginal, i.e. cannot count on overcoming the 3% barrier nationwide, while the vast majority of them are unable to win in a separate region. The aggregate electoral potential of all the nationalist parties combined barely reaches 10%. Besides, it should be borne in mind that nationalists, who have more "hetmans" than party members, are organically unable to unite. Nevertheless, they are happy to cling to any "socially close" political force, that would ensure them a free ride to parliament. At the same time they demand the right to determine the ideology of the party-benefactor, polluting the information environment around this party with their Holodomor-is-genocide xenophobic claims, discouraging the expansion of its electoral base beyond intellectually poor, but extremely violent, radical nationalist lumpen voters, who have been disappointed with Marx and Kautsky, which failed to provide them with "take everything and divide" approach, and who have transferred their stake on Ukrainian "thin-necked Hitlers (*tonkosheikh gitlerov*).

Thus, opposition journalists, political consultants, and common bloggers along with forum users cross swords, trying to choose the best - the shortest - way back in power for the current opposition, as well as argue themselves hoarse about what to do with us (the acting authorities) and our supporters after the victory. There are miserably few options: to put everyone into jail, hang or simply send out of the country. At the same time their spiritual leaders have realized the simple worldly wisdom – today's opposition will never rival the acting government and never will return into power. Because today's opposition in its Tyahnybok, Tymoshenko and post Yushchenko versions opted for radical nationalism, and radical nationalists have brought so much discredit on themselves during the five years of Yuschenko's rule, that their return to power is impossible in the foreseeable future, provided that the territorial and political unity of the Ukrainian state is preserved.

But home-made nationalists have their reason to glorify Mazepa, Bandera, Shukhevych and SS "Galicia" - like their idols, they love themselves in Ukraine, rather than Ukraine in themselves, or to be more precise themselves in the Ukrainian government. That is why today's inveterate nationalists Dmytro Pavlychko and Volodymyr Yavorivsky most of their lives served as Soviet political officers from the literature-fighters with Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism. Borys Tarasyuk served as Soviet diplomat and and as a Central Committee of the Communist Party official. Leonid Kravchuk was a Communist ideologue, and almost all the "terrarium" of politicians standing on the stage of "Maidan" for years were diligently hanging around in Leonid Kuchma's receiving office and went into opposition only after the second President of Ukraine had thrown them out of the political stratosphere for professional unsuitability and extreme thievishness.

It doesn't matter for our nationalists whether the regime is called Soviet, Ukrainian, "New Order" or "Common European House". What is really important is that there are places reserved for them in this power, not dusty, but profitable. If only they could remain in the higher political nomenklatura. And if they are sent in opposition and asked to persuade voters in the efficiency and beneficence of their concepts for the state, nationalists go into hysterics – even the state itself is no longer suitable for them, and the voters are not good enough, and the people falls short of democracy.

At some political internet forums the "nationally conscious" ["svidomi" in Ukrainian in the original - UKL] argue what would be more effective: to lower the voting age to 14-16 years old in order to give vote to young people molded in schools according to

Vakarchuk's templates [Ivan Vakarchuk was Minister of Education under Yushchenko –UKL] and therefore bound to vote "correctly", or vice versa - to introduce an upper limit at the retirement age to exclude older people, who vote "incorrectly". Meanwhile spiritual and political leaders of "post-Orangism" approach the problem in a much more radical way. They realize that no manipulation with the electoral law will help, except the ban on participation in elections to all those, who do not share ancient-Ukr [*drevneukrovskikh*, a pejorative form for Ukrainians - UKL] pre-Neanderthal views on politics, history and culture of the people of Ukraine. Therefore they are slowly but surely coming to the conclusion that, since it is impossible to rule "from the Syan to the Don" [a quotation from the anthem of Ukraine referring to Ukraine's geographical boundaries - UKL], it is worth trying to retain the cave sanctuary of nationalism from the Carpathians to the Zbruch river. Some offer to grab also Kyiv, but the savviest ones realize that the hat is not for a small head. Millions of fugitive aliens from pseudo-Piedmont will simply have nothing to eat and nowhere to work in the megapolis, if it is abandoned by the branch offices of Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Zaporozhzhia, Odesa, Crimea and other companies. A separately taken province is unable to feed and put in order even Lviv, let alone Kyiv.

The irony is that for the first time during 19 years of Ukraine's existence as an independent state people, those who call themselves Ukrainian nationalists started talking about the desirability of its disintegration: whether in the form of a separation of Galicia, or in the form of the expulsion of Donbas and Crimea from Ukraine. These are the same people that fiercely "didn't remember" the federalist (not separatist) ideas of Vyacheslav Chornovil, who already at the dawn of Ukrainian independence offered providing maximum rights to the regions (after having approved the country's administrative-territorial organization) in order to prevent the ideological intervention of the central authorities in local affairs. These are the same people who frantically attacked Viktor Tikhonov and Vadym Kolesnichenko, threw in jail Yevheniy Kushnariov and Borys Kolesnikov similar European ideas expressed in Severodonetsk. [In bold in the original. Severodonetsk was the site of a meeting held by the Party of Regions during the Orange Revolution where calls for "autonomy" were heard --UKL]

Now, not only Lutsenko is saying that in the western regions sentiments are growing in favor of separation from the rest of Ukraine, which "http://www.multitran.ru/c/m.exe?a=110&t=3698282_2_1&sc=84" fell short of expectations" of a local "Piedmont". [The national unification of Italy in the 19th century originated in the province of Piedmont –UKL] In some speeches of Oleh Tyahnybok - the most consistent of all the fighters for a "Ukrainian Ukraine" – already show up hysterical passages such as if nationalists cannot gain power throughout Ukraine, they will build their own little Ukraine behind the Zbruch - in the Greater Galicia. Two Yuriis, two "nationally conscious" writers, whose readers are declining in number (which is not amazingly large anyway) due to the drop in popularity of "national consciousness" (*svidomizm*) and obviously decline in their earnings - Vynnychuk and Andrukhovych, argue *viva voce* how beautiful life in Ukraine will be, if regions with the "wrong" people, who vote for improper politicians and who therefore, according to Vynnychuk and Andrukhovych, haven't become "real Ukrainians", are expelled from it (give to someone) Such galimatias reveals in the first place spiritual capitulation of aggressive nationalists.

But this is half of the trouble. There are plenty of outcasts in the world: someone puts himself on the circuit in the heart of Paris and smearing feces on the face barks at

passers-by, someone is talking every night to an alien mind, and someone creates "real Ukrainians." Everyone earns money as he can. In the Middle Ages those who could not fight, trade or turn up the soil, and did not want to go to a monastery - to pray, learn the grammar and rewrite books, "worked" as vagabond beggars, united into a gang of beggars, became the fairgrounds charlatans or professional holy fools. Today they are working as professional patriots.

The trouble is that the national "free media", which went into hysterics when following Ivan Nechuy-Levitsky, Ivan Franko and Pavel Skoropadsky I merely noted the presence of enormous linguistic, religious, historical and other differences between the Galicians and the residents of Great Ukraine much more significantly different from each other, than Bavarians differ from Prussians, Siberians from the dwellers of St. Petersburg, Catalans from Castilians. They completely failed to notice that their "torches of spirit" and political leaders in a far more rigid, I would even say absolutely politically incorrect form, not just declared the presence of two different Ukrainian peoples in the Ukrainian state, but also permitted themselves to determine which of these peoples are "right" and which must be corrected, or subjected to ethnic cleansing. At worst, fearing that in the course of cleansing they themselves can be cleansed (because they are in a "brilliant" numerical minority), the "engineers of human souls" from Ivano-Frankivsk offered to separate from Ukraine the regions densely populated with their "correct" people and build there a "nation state" with all the charms of apartheid and ethnic cleansings. [In bold in the original]

Neither TV-channels, which were showing in 2004 long-range artillery platforms and were claiming that "this army was sent to break up "Maidan"; nor journalists that in the same year "found Russian special forces" on Bankova, dug out dozens of "eyewitnesses," who "saw" how "the special forces" (according to another version "Pskov and Ryazan paratroopers") "unloaded in Borispol and were moving towards Kyiv on armored vehicles"; nor the online periodical, which made itself a name on the tragedy of Georgy Gongadze [Ukrainska Pravda - UKL], but today "takes interest" in him only on major holidays; nor the once popular weekly magazine and now devoted to the "Ukrainian Pinochet" [a reference to Anatoliy Hrytsenko - UKL], read only by its authors [Dzerkalo Tyzhnya - UKL], whose title "reflects" the progressive absurdity and futility of its existence - none of them have soared in righteous anger, have taken care of the protection of Ukraine's territorial integrity, nor asked the prosecutor's office to verify the compliance of the disillusioned nationalists' delirium with the Constitution and laws of Ukraine. None of them has passed the test of "Europeanness".

It's no secret that "freedom of speech" in their apprehension is a freedom of "grantoyidy" [a pejorative form for grant receivers - UKL], who are suffering from starvation, to lie about authorities that are alien to them and an opposition alien to them everything that comes to their mind, which found a vivid expression in their marginal "stop-to-censorship" appeals [in bold in the original]. And at the same time to assert insolently that the loss of billions of the United Energy Systems of Ukraine, for the complicity to which dozens of people have been or are imprisoned, "still has to be proved". But until now, the unity and unitarity of the Ukrainian state have been the "sacred cow", not only for nationalists, but also for journalists-"grantoyidy". What happened? Why are they willing to "cut into pieces their motherland"?

Finally have they realized that the people is no longer with them, the people is against them [In bold in the original -UKL]. They can no longer count on the return

to power and popular support, on the circulation of their books or periodicals funded by foreign grants and "aid" from the state treasury given a couple of years ago for Russophobic policies and rhetoric. The current government hasn't managed to cut off all the taps for illegal financing of nationalist organizations (such as "Prosvita") from the budget, but the raging torrent turned into a thin trickle, ready to get dry at any moment. It happened almost simultaneously with the termination of funding of Ukrainian "Europeans" by the American administration. Obama is not up to Bush's projects of NATO expansion as far as Bryansk and Sochi, he should vamoose out of Iraq and Afghanistan and to extricate himself from the stranglehold of the economic crisis. "The artists" [the Ukrainian word "myttsi" is used in a pejorative form - UKL] and "the fourth power" rushed to Russians, but it turned out that saving Putin is not going to fund any of his or Ukrainian intellectual impotents and idlers, who have been thrown in the trash by Obama. What to do?

There is only one option left. Of course, it is pleasant to rob all of Ukraine, forcing taxpayers to "chip in together" for the comfortable existence of the "spiritual fathers of the nation". It would be even nicer to rob the entire Soviet Union by publishing their useless "works" in millions of editions and in all foreign languages, including retro-Romanian. But once the voters of Great Ukraine proved to be too urbanized and educated for the perception and acceptance of the delusional ideas and provide their authors with "the European level of life quality", the latter have to try to focus on the robbery of a more trusting and romantic voter of Galicia.

Since this region is not very rich, not very populated, and in addition, half of its "payroll" is permanently working abroad and strives to remain there forever, it is clearly not enough for everyone. That is why within the nationalist camp the competition has escalated for the right to single-handedly control the resources and finances of the western regions. But first they seek to exclude out of the scheme the central authorities. [In bold in the original --UKL] And this is no accident.

For two decades of hopes to establish a nationalist dictatorship throughout Ukraine nationalists have blindly supported any reckless excessive strengthening of the central government, hoping to use the powers of Kyiv as a lever for the Ukrainization of the regions (at the times of early Yushchenko it even seemed that they would succeed). Now they have found out that such policies do not simply give the central government the opportunity to redistribute taxes paid by residents of Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv and Kyiv, in favor of Lviv and Ternopil, but also allow the former to control local governments as to the reasonability of the expenditures of both: subsidies from the central budget, as well as the amounts originally remaining in the local budget from taxes collected in the region. It makes it extremely difficult to transfer money to the various kinds of "prosvityany" and "myttsi" [Ukrainian words for scholars and artists used in a pejorative form - UKL], to support from the regional budget "their" parties, organizations and mass periodicals, and simply establish a system of illicit payoffs. In general, the "pro-Moscow authorities" again eat their "salo".

I won't claim that the apparatus of the current government entirely consists of holy men. However, not only Ukrainian business, but also foreign credit institutions like the IMF and World Bank are well aware that it was during the rule of "nationally conscious" that illicit payoffs and bribes were at the level of 50%, 70% or even 90% of the allocated funds [In bold in the original]. I do not wish to throw a stone to my predecessor, but cannot help pointing out that the programs of the Ministry of Education, the implementation of which began in 2002-2004, during the last years of

Yuschenko's rule were actually frozen, and in many cases even the money allocated by the Ukrainian budget or by international financial organizations, e.g. the World Bank, were not spent. My impression is that where it was impossible to steal, the work simply wasn't done. That is, either you make a payoff, or we don't give you any money.

In conclusion, I would like to address the nationalists-idealists, or plainly deceived people, who are still hoping that their idols would return to power. Your leaders have already signed a major capitulation - the spiritual one [In bold in the original]. A small army can defeat a much superior enemy if its spirit is strong. You can lose more than one battle, but win the war, if your spirit is not broken. But if a man has admitted that his powerlessness even in front of himself, he is unable to win, no matter how he ruffles outwardly or what unexpected opportunities open to him. Most briefly this axiom has been expressed by a writer [a reference to Yuriy Andrukhovych - UKL], who mistakenly considers himself European and is stoutly proud of his grandfather, an SS officer: "In Ukraine a Galician cannot become president"...

Leaders, chiefs, political thinkers of the nationalist movement have realized and acknowledged: Ukraine is not with them - Ukraine is against them [In bold in the original]. They have already agreed to rule in a remote corner in their domain and to renounce their claims for Great Ukraine. However, it is such claims that made the basis of all Ukrainian nationalist movements and doctrines from the moment of their establishment by the Austro-Hungarian secret services. In fact, Ukrainian nationalism has lost its main idea - the idea of constructing a "Ukrainian empire" in the forest-steppe zone and in the steppes of southern Russia (southward of the Pripyat marshes). Now one can talk about the Galician nationalism and even (similarly to the Basques in Spain) about the liberation movement of the Galician people, who wants to create their own state, separate from Ukraine. The danger of spreading the ideology of Shukhevich, Bandera, Mazepa and Yuschenko on Great Ukraine in theory still remains, but in practice it takes a second billing becoming a more theoretical rather than practical one.

The state is more threatened with a rift, than a return of nationalists to power. Although, it will be extremely difficult for Andrukhovych and Co. to split the country. First, despite of all their specific features Galicians have been brought up to sense themselves Ukrainians, in first place due to the efforts of nationalist propaganda, and consider separatism (even of their own "leaders") to be a crime against the nation and God. Second, the Galicians are smart enough not to sacrifice subsidies from the central budget for the selfish interests of Andrukhovych and Co. Third, the road to the EU will be closed for such a breakaway state, moreover, its residents will have more difficulties with getting to Europe even as labor migrants. To this end it's also worth realizing that to praise and take pride in SS officers is viewed as bad manners in Europe.

Thus, after the spiritual capitulation of nationalism, which served as an ideological base for "Orangism", provided that the current government's policy is minimally reasonable and coordinated, the political capitulation of all the "post-Orange" political forces will also be inevitable.

#21

Orange Revolution Erased from Ukrainian School Textbooks

by Taras Kuzio

Jamestown Foundation Blog, 7 September 2010

An analysis and interview with textbook author and historian Viktor Mysan published in *Ukrayinska Pravda* reveals the ideological orientation of the Ukrainian authorities who came to power in February. During the preceding five years, Viktor Yanukovich had never accepted the legitimacy of the Orange Revolution or his defeat in 2004, ignoring a Supreme Court ruling and parliamentary resolution, and, worse still, adhered to the Russian view that the mass protests were nothing more than 'political technology.' This is post-Soviet speak for a black ops conspiracy that was undertaken by the US through the rhetoric of democracy promotion pursued by the Bush administration.

It was always, therefore, a mistake to view Yanukovich in the 2010 elections, despite five years of 'grooming' by U.S. consultants Manafort and Davis, as a 're-born democrat.' In order for this to be true, Yanukovich would have had to condemn the mass fraud committed in the 2004 elections, embrace the authenticity and domestic origins of the Orange Revolution and accept his own defeat.

This unwillingness to accept responsibility casts a shadow over another aspiring politician – Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Tigipko – who seeks to refashion himself as a 're-born new face democrat.' Tigipko has also steadfastly refused to condemn the 2004 fraud that took place when he was head of Yanukovich's election campaign. Therefore, we cannot trust the genuineness of his democratic credentials until he acts like a democrat and condemns the 2004 election fraud.

The real Yanukovich (not the PR version of this year's election that most Western newspapers such as the *Financial Times* accepted) has always had the same hostile view of the 'orange nightmare' (as he once put it) as Russian leaders. It is therefore no wonder that his Minister of Education, Dmytro Tabachnyk, has quickly taken the initiative to remove the Orange Revolution from school textbooks in a move that smacks of George Orwell's famous novel *Nineteen Eighty-Four*.

Ukraine retains a Soviet-style centralization of educational policy and textbooks published in Kyiv are distributed in both Ukrainian and Russian throughout the country. The textbooks for the fifth class that are being published in a 506,000 print run have a new front cover void of the background containing the Orange Revolution protests that was included in the 2005 edition. The 2010 edition has only Cossack leaders on the front cover. In the 2010 edition the Orange Revolution is ignored and replaced by very brief information on the 2004 and 2010 presidential elections, the Viktor Yushchenko presidency and the election of Yanukovich.

Mysan places the removal of the Orange Revolution within the context of an overall new line in the 2010 edition that portrays the authorities as bowing to Russian pressure. 'The majority of the Ministry's recommendations (to the author) are tied to the formation of another, less aggressive, face of our eastern neighbor – Russia. Besides the Orange Revolution, other episodes that have been cut out of the new edition include when Ukrainians fought against Russia for independence. Also, the 1933 famine is no longer designated as 'artificial' and directed against Ukraine.

These twenty 'recommendations' of the Ministry of Education are the first that textbook writers such as Mysan have been forced to deal with throughout independent Ukraine's fourteen previous governments. The 2010 edition edits out parts of Ukrainian history that are seen as 'anti-Russian' by Moscow, as reflected in the condemnation of Ukraine's humanities policies under Yushchenko in President Dmitri Medvedev's August 2009 open letter to the Ukrainian president.

The Orange Revolution followed the Serbian 'bulldozer' and Georgian 'Rose' democratic revolutions in 2000 and 2003 respectively. These in turn followed mass protests that had similarly removed post-communist leaders who had retained power after the collapse of communism in Romania (1996), Bulgaria (1997), Slovakia (1998) and Croatia (1999).

Of these democratic breakthroughs, Ukraine's Orange Revolution was the largest (one in five Ukrainians participated), the most peaceful (in Serbia parliament was set on fire and in Georgia the parliament was stormed) and the longest (lasting 17 days). The Orange Revolution will continue to be seen by Western and some Ukrainian historians as an epochal event similar to Ukraine's 1991 declaration of independence.

On a final note, optimism by Atlantic Council of the US Senior Non-resident Fellow Adrian Karatnycky that Tabachnyk is an aberration and on his way out is unlikely to materialize, as this ignores the ideological dimension of the Party of Regions and wrongly assumes that 'pragmatic' oligarchs run the party and Yanukovych. It was this view that led many in the West (but not the Jamestown Foundation) to believe that there was no difference between Yanukovych and Yulia Tymoshenko in this year's Ukrainian elections. In reality, subsequent events have shown that Yanukovych represents a fundamental Russophile break in Ukraine's post-Soviet trajectory from its Ukrainophile three former presidents, as predicted by Jamestown Foundation authors.

Karatnycky wrote in the Kyiv Post in a debate with Rutgers University Professor Alexander Motyl that, 'On the matter of culture, I am in broad agreement with Motyl. We both disagree fundamentally with the Ukrainophobic policies of Education Minister Dmytro Tabachnyk and with the naming of a Stalin apologist as head of the Institute of National Memory. I still believe that these odious appointments can and will be reversed. Nevertheless, I think that Yanukovych is right in trying to ensure a hospitable environment for Ukraine's Russian-speakers. Such steps, in my view, are likely to deepen their support for Ukraine's statehood'.

In reality, Tabachnyk is an integral ideological component of the Party of Regions and the Yanukovych administration, and he is in his position for the long haul because Russia demanded influence over government appointments in the humanities and security forces. With the expunging this month of the Orange Revolution from the textbooks used in schools, Ukraine's students will be left wondering why they are no longer taught about an event that many of their parents, uncles and cousins participated in and, more importantly, what country is being built where history is edited out for political purposes.

The Ministry of Truth is where the main character of the book *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, Winston Smith, works. The Ukrainian authorities' approach to history would permit the substitution of Winston Smith for Tabachnyk and the Ministry of Education for the Ministry of Truth.

#22

Second Native

by Dmytro Horon

Segodnya (Kyiv), 9 September 2010

[translated by BBC Monitoring]

Deputies have decided to make a radical decision on the language issue. On Tuesday [7 September] a draft law "On languages in Ukraine" was registered in the Supreme Council by three deputies - Oleksandr Yefremov of the [pro-presidential] Party of Regions, communist Petro Symonenko and Serhiy Hrynivetsky of the Lytvyn Bloc. If it is supported by parliament, Ukraine will become de facto bilingual. Russian will be used in all spheres of life. Along with this there will be a guarantee of the free use of other regional languages, which the legislators apply to Belarusian, Bulgarian, Armenian, Gagauz, Yiddish, Crimean Tatar, Moldavian [as published], German, Greek, Polish, Romany, Romanian, Slovak and Hungarian. The action extends to those languages that are used by at least 10 per cent of the people inhabiting a certain territory.

A separate article in the bill is devoted to the functioning of the Russian language, which is given special status. The deputies are proposing to recognize Ukrainian-Russian bilingualism as "an important asset of the Ukrainian people" and note that the majority of Ukrainian citizens speak Russian. Expansion of the rights of the Russian language in Ukraine was one of the election promises of [President] Viktor Yanukovich, but in order to give it the status of a second state language, they would have to amend the constitution. The proposed law essentially solves this problem: Ukrainian remains the only state language, while at the same time it will be possible to speak Russian or any other language understandable to most people in the region everywhere. It is probably the approach of local elections that has made the authorities recall their election promises: finally something must be offered to voters in the south-east [where Russian is the majority language].

There is a fairly high probability that the law will be adopted, since its sponsors are representatives of all three coalition parties (previously it was thought that the Lytvyn faction would oppose the enactment of laws on languages). It is also worth noting that in many aspects (in education, the media, and indeed ideologically), the current bill much more radically expands the rights of the Russian language than the bills that were earlier submitted by the Party of Regions.

Assessments of bill

Evaluations. The deputy chairman of the Party of Regions faction, Mykhaylo Chechetov, is convinced that the adoption of such a law would benefit the unity of Ukraine. "This is a step toward creating comfortable language conditions of life for all citizens of our country," Mr Chechetov says. "It is time for politicians to understand that their vision of life must not be imposed on people. The west of the country [where Ukrainian is the majority language] should not teach the east how to live, and the east - the west. Everyone should feel comfortable in their own country; this is the only way to build a democratic, free country."

In the opposition the bill was met with hostility. According to the head of the Supreme Council's committee on cultural affairs, MP Volodymyr Yavorivskyy of the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc, the bill is unconstitutional: "When the authors say that they are adhering to the charter on regional languages, they are being cunning. Ukraine has ratified it, but parliament did it with a mistranslation. In fact, the charter refers only to languages threatened with disappearance. In Ukraine, that may apply to Karaites and Romany, but not Russian. Well, show me where the Russian language is being endangered. And if, when entering a higher educational establishment, the question of knowledge of the state language is abolished, frankly speaking, this will not be a state, but a railway station."

Another deputy, Andriy Shkil of the YTB, has not yet seen the bill, but even without reading it, he is sure that it will do no good to Ukraine: "But you see what the current authorities are doing with Ukraine: they are destroying Ukrainian history, language, literature and culture. We one hundred per cent will not vote for this law."

The most radical changes to the situation in the language question will be made by the rules in the bill on education (an area that was most affected by Ukrainianization). In accordance with the aforesaid, students and parents of underage schoolchildren will write statements on which language they (their children) want to be taught. This will quickly correct the "excesses of Ukrainianization in Russian-speaking cities, including Kiev (we remind you that schools and higher educational establishments in the past 15 years were transferred to Ukrainian without the consent of the pupils, parents and students).

Implications for media, official documents

TV and cinema. All restrictions are being removed on language for private TV companies (and all our leading television channels are private). This means that TV companies, should the law be passed, will be able to screen an unlimited amount of Russian-language broadcasts and films (currently they are limited by strict quotas, which represent the minimum allowable amount of broadcasts in Ukrainian). By the way, if the law is passed, Russian dubbing of foreign films also will return to cinemas.

Names. In addition, the names of citizens can be written in documents (in particular, in foreign passports) not in the Ukrainian version, but in the native language in Ukrainian transcription. This requirement is to be met at the request of the owner of the document (for example, you can ask to be recorded not as Mykhaylo [Ukrainian version], but Mikhail [Russian version in Ukrainian transcription]). In internal passports there has to be the Ukrainian and Russian spelling of the first name, patronymic and surname (which, incidentally, there is now). You can also request that the documents duplicate data in the regional language (Hungarian, Bulgarian, etc).

Courts. Courts, when selecting staff are required to consider the possibility of conducting sittings in a regional language (if necessary providing an interpreter free of charge). Evidence and procedural documents can be submitted in a regional language. Judicial decisions are to be compiled in Ukrainian, but if necessary they should be translated into a regional language. Also, law-enforcement officers must inform a person of the reasons for his detention or arrest in a language that he understands.

#23

Demjanjuk Trial Resumes in Germany

Associated Press, 13 September 2010

MUNICH, Germany—Ukrainian guards risked being killed by their SS supervisors if they tried to flee Nazi death camps where they served, according to evidence presented Monday at the trial of John Demjanjuk, the retired Ohio autoworker accused of being a death-camp guard.

The 90-year-old, Ukrainian-born Mr. Demjanjuk has denied ever having served as a guard. However, the historical evidence could bolster his defense's separate argument that any Ukrainians who agreed to serve the Nazis did so to escape deplorable conditions in prisoner-of-war camps, or possible death, and couldn't flee once they learned they would be guarding death camps.

Mr. Demjanjuk faces 28,060 counts of accessory to murder on allegations he served as a guard at the Nazis' Sobibor death camp in occupied Poland. The prosecution argues that after Mr. Demjanjuk, a Soviet Red Army soldier, was captured by the Germans in 1942 he agreed to serve under the SS as a guard.

Mr. Demjanjuk says he spent most of the rest of the war in Nazi POW camps before joining the so-called Vlasov Army of anti-communist Soviet POWs and others. That army was formed to fight with the Germans against the encroaching Soviets in the final months of the war.

A 1943 letter from the Auschwitz death camp administration to authorities in Germany, presented to the court Monday, seemed to reinforce the defense argument.

In it, the Auschwitz officials reported that 15 Ukrainian guards attempted to escape and that while six succeeded, one was recaptured and eight were killed.

The reading of historical evidence into the record by trial judges came after a month-long summer break in the trial, which began last November.

Unlike in previous sessions, Mr. Demjanjuk wore regular glasses instead of sunglasses and had no cap pulled low over his face.

When asked by Presiding Judge Ralph Alt if he was feeling well enough to follow the proceedings sitting up rather than lying on a bed as usual, however, he said he wasn't.

``I must lie down," he said through his interpreter.

#24

**The "Bandera-OUN Debate", triggered by Yushchenko's decree proclaiming Stepan Bandera a Hero of Ukraine in early 2010, included an op/ed by Askold Lozynskyi, published in Kyiv Post on 16 February, called "Rewriting History: An Evidentiary Perspective," focused mostly on John-Paul Himka's work. Himka was then unable to have his rebuttal, "Ukrainian Past and Ukrainian Future", published by Kyiv Post and

the item appeared in UKL442 (15 March 2010). Curiously, the same rebuttal suddenly appeared on the Kyiv Post website on 21 September 2010, which prompted another reply by Lozynskyi (who mistakenly assumed that Himka was late by seven months in responding to him), and then by Himka again, both in Kyiv Post (the two items appear below). For the original "Ukrainian Past and Ukrainian Future" article by Himka, as well as fifteen items of Part II of the "Bandera-OUN Debate", go to <http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/pdf/UKL442.pdf>. For Part I of the debate, <http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/pdf/UKL441.pdf>-DA**

History Should be Written by Objective and Competent Scholars

by Askold S. Lozynskyj

Kyiv Post, 22 September 2010

Seven months after I "vehemently...responded" to his exposition of Jewish eyewitness accounts on the role of the OUN-UPA, John Paul Himka offers his defense. Frankly, I am surprised by his tardiness since I thought that he had recognized his errors and let this matter rest. More importantly, I am disturbed by his abysmal lack of scholarship and the impossibility of preventing anyone from spouting canards and defamation without recourse.

Case in point, Himka confronts the hearsay charge by offering what I can only assume to be his strongest direct testimony, that of a "ten-year-old boy whose father had been killed by Banderites just two months before he testified to the Jewish Historical Commission."

The ten-year old is a sympathetic, but traumatized, easily influenced and most eager to embellish witness whose testimony may be given weight for the proposition that his father was killed indeed, but certainly not as to who killed him. In any event, apparently, even that witness does not label the perpetrators as members of the OUN or UPA, but as Banderites. For that witness, Banderites is a generic name for Ukrainians.

On the charge of lack of supporting (corroborating) documentary evidence, Mr. Himka offers a "book of reports of UPA's Kolodzinsky division, for example, about how they stumbled upon twelve Hungarian Jews hiding in the forest in Volhynia and "dispatched them to the bosom of Abraham."" Official reports are generally admissible and reliable when they are kept in the ordinary course of business and thus are an exception to the hearsay rule. Naturally, reports must be distinguished from memoirs, which are fertile ground for embellishment. The big problem with this piece of "evidence" offered by Mr. Himka is that Mykhailo Kolodzinsky was the Carpathian Sich Headquarters Chief who fought the the Hungarian army after the proclamation of Carpathian Ukrainian independence. He may have killed Hungarian Jews who were in that Hungarian army which, by the way, was backed by Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. He was shot by the Hungarians in 1939 in Carpathian Ukraine. He never fought in the UPA in Volhynia. By the way, the UPA was formed in 1942, three years after Kolodzinsky was shot. Mr. Himka pays little attention to names and dates, and thus plays loosely with facts.

But wait, there's more. Mr. Himka offers a new variety of evidence, an alleged OUN document from Soviet archives, a witness protocol from Soviet judicial proceedings, and corroboration as to authenticity of evidence offered by his colleague, Marco Carynnyk, not an attorney, not a paper or handwriting expert, and not a historian. Mr. Himka's submissions here are disingenuous as he must be aware of Soviet

predilection for forging both documents and witness protocols. As to his colleague, Mr. Himka certainly knows Mr. Carynnyk's lack of credentials.

Finally, he attempts a condemnation of the OUN for murdering Poles in Volynia by quoting "the original founder of OUN, Taras Bulba-Borovets." In this instance Mr. Himka's playing loose with the facts is obscene as Taras Bulba-Borovets was not involved in any way with founding the OUN.

There is one statement in Mr. Himka's piece that highlights his sparse attention to detail, his irreverence with names: "Lozynskyj also tries to discredit my research by stating that my award of a fellowship from the US Holocaust Memorial Museum shows that I am working for the Jews." No, it shows that you are working for the US Holocaust Memorial Museum. While, I would never accuse all Jews of having an agenda, it is indisputable that the purpose ("raison d'être") of the US Holocaust Memorial Museum is to keep the memory alive.

Sweeping generalizations such as "It is an undeniable fact, though, that OUN organized pogroms and mass violence against Jews and others throughout western Ukraine in July 1941," or hearsay such "OUN leaders communicated among themselves...about the need to exterminate Jews," or arguing that lack of evidence makes a negative argument "Why is there no paper trail showing similar falsification of evidence about OUN militias?", all with no corroboration, deserve no credibility or weight. It is precisely that credibility and weight of evidence that is lacking in Mr. Himka's work.

After the Soviets reoccupied Lviv in the fall of 1944, they set up an Extraordinary State Commission on German atrocities in the Lviv region. The Commission consisted of members of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and other influential members of the Soviet government. Its findings were published in 1945. The Commission's work consisted of hearing eyewitness accounts and reviewing medical reports. It concluded that Gestapo detachments had prepared lists of Lviv intellectuals who were slated for destruction even before the Germans entered the city. The Commission not only compiled a list of victims and description of their suffering, but also provided a record of individuals from various branches of the German security services, who had participated in the criminal activities.

These and other Soviet findings from other regions served as evidence for Soviet Chief Prosecutor at the Nuremberg Trials General Roman Rudenko and Soviet Chief Counselor of Justice Lev N. Smirnov. The findings at Nuremberg did not accuse, much less even mention the OUN, the UPA, Stepan Bandera or Roman Shukhevych or Nachtigal of any wrongdoing. Hopefully, this will satisfy even Mr. Himka.

#25

The Lviv Pogrom of 1941

by John-Paul Himka

Kyiv Post, 23 September 2010

John-Paul Himka is the author of "Ukrainians, Jews and the Holocaust: Divergent Memories" (Saskatoon: Heritage Press, 2009).

There are two things I can agree with in Askold S. Lozynskyj's latest philippic against me in the Kyiv Post ("History should be written by competent and objective scholars"). The first is his title: "History should be written by objective and competent scholars." Absolutely. The second is that I erred in writing that Taras Bulba-Borovets was the founder of the Organization for Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) instead of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). I meant to write the latter, but accidentally wrote the former. Mea culpa.

The importance of leaving this work to professionally trained historians is brought home by Lozynskyj's confusion of the person of Mykhailo Kolodzinsky with the UPA division named after him, which was part of Army North.

The book of reports from that unit includes explicit accounts of the murder of Jewish survivors in the forests.

There is not room to respond to all the points in Lozynskyj's syllabus errorum, so I will just limit myself to the evidence about the Lviv pogrom of 1941.

Although in April 1941 the Bandera faction of OUN had repudiated pogroms, it was obliged to revise its stand when Reinhard Heydrich explicitly called for such "self-cleansing actions" on June 17.

At that time, OUN was coordinating its military activities with the Germans. On June 25, Yaroslav Stetsko wrote to Stepan Bandera that OUN had "formed a militia to remove the Jews" (usuvaty zhydiv). A week later, on July 1, the pogrom took place. The head of the OUN underground, Ivan Klymiv, issued leaflets that were affixed to walls in Lviv on July 1. One of them said that revolutionary tribunals would punish enemies of the Ukrainian movement, applying "family and national responsibility for crimes against the Ukrainian State and Ukrainian Army." Another said: "Nation! Know! Moscow, Poland, Hungarians, Jews are your enemies. Destroy them."

At this time, OUN was setting up its own Ukrainian state, heralded as a "Ukraine for Ukrainians."

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Eyewitness testimony identifying the OUN militia as arresting Jews for pogrom activities includes Jewish survivor accounts recorded by the Jewish Historical Commission in Poland right after the war as well as videotaped interviews collected all over the world by the Shoah Foundation in 1994-2002.

In addition to testimony in these two large collections, other Jewish memoirs and testimonies, written or recorded in different times, places, and circumstances, confirm that Ukrainian militiamen were playing the leading role in the Lviv pogrom. There are also Polish witnesses to the active participation of the Ukrainian militia.

Films and photographs document Ukrainian militiamen on the scene of and taking part in the pogrom. A film of the exhumation of NKVD victims at Brygidki prison shows a Ukrainian militiaman, identifiable by his armband, beating one of the Jews

pressed into the "prison action." A film screened at the Nuremberg trial shows a militiaman in uniform holding a half-clad woman by the hair and beating her with her baton. The film, focussing on the events at Zamarstyniv St. prison, has largely deteriorated over the intervening decades, but stills were salvaged. Another photo shows a uniformed militiaman with his armband on his left upper arm taking part in the arrest of Jews on a Lviv street.

In the days following the pogrom, the Germans organized large-scale executions of Jews in which thousands were shot. Again, testimonies of those who were lucky enough to survive this action identified "Ukrainians" and sometimes specifically Ukrainian militiamen as the ones who rounded them up. Moreover, German documentation shows that the Ukrainian militia in Lviv was subordinated to the SS on 2 July when the executions began.

In addition to these documentary proofs, there are many arguments that can be made contextually. For example, the Germans always worked through local organizations in planning "spontaneous" anti-Jewish violence. This we know from Tomasz Szarota's comparative study of pogroms and other antisemitic excesses in Warsaw, Paris, Antwerp, Amsterdam, and Kaunas. If not OUN, who was the Germans' partner in the Lviv pogrom? We have German documentation that the OUN militia was the organizer of the pogrom in nearby Zolochiv.

In short, OUN's role in the anti-Jewish pogrom that took place in Lviv on July 1, 1941, cannot be questioned by an objective and competent scholar, but I am quite sure that Lozynskyj will stick to his own view of this matter.

#26

What We Need to Know About the Holocaust

by Timothy Snyder

New York Review of Books, 30 September 2010

The Death of the Shtetl

by Yehuda Bauer

Yale University Press, 208 pp., \$35.00; \$23.00 (paper)

Historians of the Jews and the Holocaust

by David Engel

Stanford University Press, 314 pp., \$65.00

The Warsaw Ghetto: A Guide to the Perished City

by Barbara Engelking and Jacek Leociak, translated from the Polish by Emma Harris

Yale University Press, 906 pp., \$75.00

The Years of Extermination: Nazi Germany and the Jews, 1939–1945

by Saul Friedländer

HarperPerennial, 870 pp., \$19.99 (paper)

Worse than War: Genocide, Eliminationism, and the Ongoing Assault on Humanity

by Daniel Jonah Goldhagen

PublicAffairs, 658 pp., \$29.95

The Destruction of the European Jews, Third Edition
by Raul Hilberg
Yale University Press, three volumes, \$190.00

Je suis le dernier Juif: Treblinka, 1942–1943
by Chil Rajchman, translated from the Yiddish by Gilles Rozier
Paris: Éditions des Arènes, 150 pp., €14.80

Nim słońce wszędzie: Dziennik pisany w ukryciu, 1943–1944
by Marek Szapiro
Warsaw: Żydowski Instytut Historyczny, 682 pp., zł40.00

We don't have a history of the Holocaust that is set in the Eastern European lands where the victims died, and that describes the interactions of the German invaders, the Jewish inhabitants, and the peoples among whom the Jews lived. Why not? The vast literature on the Holocaust based on German sources, though it represents perhaps the most impressive historical research of recent decades, seldom draws from Eastern European languages. Eastern European historians, for their part, have traditionally avoided a topic that transcends national history and challenges national myths of innocence. In *Historians of the Jews and the Holocaust*, the NYU historian David Engel suggests a surprising addition to this list of limitations: historians of Jewish life, scholars comfortable with the *longue durée* of Jewish history and with Hebrew and Yiddish, have sequestered Jewish societies and institutions from the Holocaust. Over decades, says Engel, they have built a "wall separating study of the Holocaust from study of all other aspects of the Jewish past."

In much of Eastern Europe for much of the half-millennium before the Holocaust, Jews had managed, in various ways and to various degrees, to oversee their own religious and communal affairs. Because the Jewish institutions of the Nazi era—the Jewish councils and the Jewish police forces—drew from pre-war elites, they looked uncomfortably like a continuation of Jewish tradition. Because these institutions aided the Germans in the ghetto roundups and deportations that preceded the mass shootings and gassings of the Holocaust, the Eastern European Jewish tradition could seem like a dead end. After the Holocaust and the establishment of the State of Israel, Engel maintains, scholars found it difficult to integrate the mass killing of the Jews into a history of Jewish life.

For some Israelis the Jewish councils and police forces were a perversion of an essentially sound tradition that had preserved Jewish life for centuries despite the difficulties of diaspora, for others a confirmation that diaspora life was itself a perversion. The issue brought so much unease in Israel, Engel suggests, that Israeli scholars preferred to avoid open international scholarly discussion of it. Contrary to what outsiders might suppose, "Zionist historiography has hardly placed the Holocaust at the center of its agenda."^[1]

These sensitivities were heightened, Engel argues, by the appearance of the first systematic study of the Holocaust. In 1961 a little-known young American scholar, Raul Hilberg, published *The Destruction of the European Jews*, now in a third edition and still the basic guide to the institutions that brought about the expropriation and murder of German and European Jews. In some brief passages on the Jewish councils, Hilberg drew damning conclusions about Jewish self-destruction. His chief sources were German reports from the field and documents from German administrative offices in Berlin. These sources described Jewish councils and Jewish policemen collecting valuables, arranging for labor brigades, and urging cooperation

in the "selections" that preceded death by bullets or gas. Since Hilberg did not rely upon Jewish memoirs, he did not note the many (if usually futile) attempts by a number of Jewish councils to improve the desperate lot of their people, let alone their widespread (although usually defeated) attempts to conspire against the Germans. Most difficult of all to extract from German sources were the almost ubiquitous efforts to preserve Jewish religious and cultural life, which Yehuda Bauer, a professor at Hebrew University in Jerusalem and academic adviser to Yad Vashem, includes within his notion of Jewish resistance, or *amidah*.

At the time of its first edition, writes Engel, Hilberg's pioneering work seemed to confirm the dangers of mixing the history of Jewish life with the history of mass Jewish death. In Israel, the history of the Holocaust was entrusted to a separate state institution, Yad Vashem; in America, historians of Jewish life used methodology as an excuse not to write about the Holocaust. Major scholars such as Steven Zipperstein and Paula Hyman wished to prevent Hitler from shaping the history of earlier centuries of Jewish life.

Engel, who sees modern Jewish history in Europe as of a piece, and believes that it is right to understand the whole with respect to its end, regards the restraint of his colleagues as "little more than a discursive affectation." He is correct to note the historians' hesitation, but he is unconvincing in his critique of their historical method. The danger of defining previous Jewish history entirely with respect to the Holocaust is real enough among scholars, university students, and the general public. The resistance of historians to determinism and teleology provides one defensible way (as the works of Hyman and Zipperstein show) to produce lively accounts of the variety of Jewish experience in modern Europe in the centuries before the Holocaust.[2]

The problem Engel sees arises partly (though not entirely) from the definitions he uses to categorize historians. He criticizes historians of Jewish life for not engaging with the Holocaust. In his account, historians of the Holocaust figure not so much as Jewish historians but as a problem for Jewish historians. But with just a slight shift in perspective, one could see Hilberg as representing a different tradition of Jewish scholarship, that of Jewish historians who rely on German-language primary sources to document the collapse of a German civilization to which they themselves, in some measure, belong.

This tradition continues a major current of modern Jewish intellectual life, that of the Jewish Enlightenment (*Haskalah*) in its Central European form. Much of the outstanding work by historians published in the United States, from Hilberg's through Saul Friedländer's, could be classified in this way. In this light, Friedländer's latest work, *The Years of Extermination: Nazi Germany and the Jews, 1939-1945*, a powerful narrative account of German killing policy that draws on Jewish memoirs and evokes the lives of Jewish victims, addresses Engel's challenge. Because Friedländer uses chiefly German-language sources, however, his portrayal of Jewish life is bound within a familiar but in fact atypical perspective. He makes excellent use of important first-person sources, such as the diaries of Victor Klemperer, whose situation, that of a Jewish husband protected by marriage to a non-Jewish German wife, was all but unthinkable in lands further east. In occupied Poland, where there were also many mixed marriages, Jewish husbands of non-Jewish Polish wives were sent to ghettos, deported to death factories, and gassed. German Jews were a very small proportion of the victims of the Holocaust, some 3 percent. Polish Jews were more than half.

A complete account of Jewish life and death in Europe, and thus the meeting of European and Jewish history, would have to be centered in Poland, where most of the victims of the Holocaust lived and even more of the victims died.[3] As Engel mentions, there is also the school of Polish-Jewish positivist historians, concerned chiefly with the collection of sources. Today its best-known member is Emanuel Ringelblum, who organized the archive of the Warsaw ghetto, an invaluable source for scholars working in Polish or Yiddish (the languages of Warsaw Jews). The same tradition also continues in the archival collections of the Jewish Historical Institute in Warsaw, which include thousands of surveys of Holocaust survivors, in Polish and Yiddish, taken right after the war.

Although Engel does not discuss them as such, historians within this Polish-Jewish tradition might also be regarded as scholars of Jewish life who write about the Holocaust. Since the end of communism in Poland in 1989, this empirical approach has been revived by the new Polish Center for Holocaust Studies, and also (though unevenly) by the official Institute for National Remembrance. The Jewish Historical Institute, under new leadership, has published and annotated sources such as the diary of Marek Szapiro, who survived in hiding in Warsaw. Though postwar testimonies are many, actual diaries are very few. Szapiro's diary—written and published in Polish—is particularly important, since it recounts the daily efforts of a Jew in Warsaw to make sense of the last years of the war, and includes frank discussions of personal relationships with non-Jewish Poles, including rescuers and blackmailers. The most important recent example of this Polish-Jewish positivist tradition is the encyclopedic and now indispensable guide to the Warsaw ghetto by Barbara Engelking and Jacek Leociak, now available in an excellent English-language edition.

The Polish-Jewish positivist school has the vices of its virtues: it transmits valuable Polish (and sometimes Yiddish) sources, but does not take account of the interpretative discussions taking place in German and English. Its very important findings, which include detailed examples of Jewish resistance, are thus usually ignored in the larger debates.[4]

Perhaps the most appealing feature of Engel's book is its open-ended conclusion. Although he makes clear his own view—that the Holocaust was an unsurprising end to an increasingly difficult period of Jewish history—he understands that the conclusions of future researchers are impossible to predict. Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, by contrast, in *Worse than War*, takes the view that we already know all that we need to know about the Holocaust, and indeed about all of the other calamities of the twentieth century. In an earlier work, *Hitler's Willing Executioners*,^[5] Goldhagen sought to explain the Holocaust as an expression of a longstanding and special German "eliminationist anti-Semitism." One criticism of that book was its limited attention to other anti-Semitic and racist cultural traditions—for example, among Germany's neighbors—which, were Goldhagen's thesis true, would also have brought about Holocausts. In his current book, Goldhagen responds to that criticism by replacing "eliminationist anti-Semitism" with "eliminationism," a state of mind among people who take part in mass murder.

Rather than refining his simple explanation, he merely extends it from the Holocaust to other genocides.^[6] Mass murder is to be understood as a matter of will: the "decision-making moment," he maintains, is a "self-sufficient account for why these people perpetrate mass murder and elimination." Goldhagen asserts that other students of the Holocaust clutter the story with colonial institutions set up by

Germany in the countries it occupied during World War II. Rather than consider the political or historical backdrop, we should rely upon our intuitions, upon "what we know about individual and social life in general." This ostensible knowledge includes the capacity to perceive the "beast within"—within other people, that is, never Goldhagen himself or his readers. National societies, we are to understand, differ in their level of subhumanity: "there is variation of beastliness across cultures and subcultures."

Goldhagen's writing has been, as his publisher says, "very popular," perhaps because it is tempting to distinguish among murderers and the murdered in such a stark way. Goldhagen's own categories, if rigorously applied, reveal a problem of his approach. For Goldhagen, a "perpetrator" is someone who "knowingly contributes in some tangible way to the deaths or elimination of others, or to injuring others as part of an annihilationist or an eliminationist program." How would such a definition apply in the case of one of the worst of the Nazi crimes, the mass murder of the Jews of Warsaw in the summer of 1942?

Goldhagen is right that no account can do without the ideologically motivated leaders; he mentions Hitler and Himmler. One might add Odilo Globocnik, the SS leader who was responsible for the liquidation of the ghettos in the German colony known as the General Government, including the extermination of Jews; or his deputy Hermann Höfle, who along with his German SS and police subordinates oversaw deportations from individual ghettos. In Engelking and Leociak's compendium of the creation and destruction of the Warsaw ghetto, the importance of its two thousand Jewish policemen is also excruciatingly clear. They did most of the work and they knew what was happening; by Goldhagen's definition, they too were "perpetrators." As such, the Jewish policemen must have acted, in Goldhagen's account, according to their anti-Semitic desire to eliminate Jews. This is absurd.

Goldhagen might of course counter that Jewish policemen acted from nonideological motivations, such as the desire to save themselves or their families. But his analysis leaves no room for perpetrators who act according to such calculations. He might wish to argue that Jewish policemen armed with clubs were taking orders from German policemen armed with guns, as was the case. But Goldhagen explicitly and repeatedly denies the importance of coercion to the actions of perpetrators. He seems reluctant to examine the layers of authority that brought Jews to the death factories; he calls the gas chambers "incidental implements" of mass murder. Most historians would reject that formulation.

Goldhagen is of course right that anti-Semitism is indispensable to the explanation of the Holocaust. Where Goldhagen differs from other scholars is his impatience with plural causality, and, in this new book, with historical analysis that might reveal what linked the hatred to the killing. He is wrong to see free will, and only free will, everywhere we find mass killing. The Holocaust as it actually happened involved the participation of many tens of thousands of people who, contrary to Goldhagen, had no "decision-making moment," had not "freely opted" to participate in the killing, and had taken part in no murderous "conversation about the dehumanized or demonized victims."

Just as Jewish policemen under German command provided most of the labor for the deportation of Warsaw Jews to Treblinka, captured Soviet soldiers under German command operated that death facility. In Chil Rajchman's troubling and moving memoir of Treblinka, as in earlier memoirs by others of the handful of Treblinka

survivors, these guards and executioners figure as human beings.[7] The people operating the death facility in 1942 were survivors of the Germans' other major policy of mass killing, the deliberate starvation of Soviet prisoners of war. These men, of various national backgrounds, had in common Soviet citizenship and a Soviet education that was anti-racist and anti-anti-Semitic. They had very likely saved their own lives by collaborating. They had been recruited for a task they neither foresaw nor chose, while imprisoned in starvation camps in which about two million Soviet soldiers had died before the gas chambers of Treblinka were in operation. Like the Jewish policemen, they were not free actors realizing their individual wills within "supportive eliminationist milieus."

How exactly did these Jewish policemen (Polish citizens) and these Treblinka guards (Soviet citizens) come under German power? Goldhagen writes as if Hitler had always controlled most of Europe's Jews. He claims that the Nazis experimented with various "eliminationist" solutions before deciding to kill the Jews of Europe. It is true that the German leadership, through terror, intimidation, and theft, brought about the emigration of over half of Germany's Jews. It is also true that Hitler and other leaders considered various deportation schemes that would rid Europe of Jews. But the Nazi regime could not have killed (or in any other way eliminated) the Jews of Europe without war, since in 1939 almost all of Europe's Jews lived beyond Germany's borders. In the first six years of Hitler's rule, before Germany attacked Poland, the regime killed Jews by the hundreds. Between 1939 and 1941, after the invasion of Poland but before the invasion of the Soviet Union, Jews died by the tens of thousands in the ghettos. After the invasion of the Soviet Union, Jews were shot and gassed by the millions.

Though Goldhagen prefers not to mention other scholars by name, he has an epithet for people who wish to complicate his account with factors such as institutions and war: "apologists." The intellectual authority he prefers is that of the killers themselves. He repeatedly cites the words of murderers, and concludes from what they say of their own motives that his account must be the right one.

The notion that the motivation to kill is the same as the explanation provided by killers defies what we do indeed know of individual and social life. Some people enjoy killing and kill from hatred. But others, probably a far larger number, seek explanations for their extraordinary acts, and find them in the ideology or rhetoric supplied by those who hold power. They repeat the claims of criminal leaders, but we must not confuse their secondhand ideology with a full explanation. Reiterating the reasoning of the killers in the guise of scholarly analysis risks not only naive error but emulation of their thinking.

After noting that the Nazis dehumanized their Jewish (and other) victims, Goldhagen himself associates human beings with beasts: not as a rhetorical flourish, which would be bad enough, but as a category within his major argument. After reminding the reader that the Nazis defined their Jewish victims as bearers of disease, he himself applies the very category he finds in Nazi rhetoric ("pathology") to the perpetrators—and to "Political Islamists," such as Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who he believes will become perpetrators in the future. Goldhagen's emphasis on will, propaganda, and subhumanity recalls the 1930s; his book is less an analysis of the age of mass killing than its angry product. As Yehuda Bauer points out, "our moral problem" with the Holocaust "is not that the perpetrators were inhuman but that they were human, just like ourselves, and that we human beings are prone to the kind of murderousness they evinced."

After decades as a leading scholar of the Holocaust, Bauer has turned his attention in *The Death of the Shtetl* to its epicenter: the belt of territory between the Baltic and the Black Seas, occupied first by the Soviet Union from September 1939 as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact between Moscow and Berlin, and then by Germany from June 1941 after the Nazis betrayed their Soviet allies. It was here, in eastern Poland, northeastern Romania, and the Baltic States, that the Holocaust began, and here that more than a quarter of its victims died. In eastern Poland, the largest part of this zone, traditional Orthodox Jewish small towns, or shtetlach, were commonplace until World War II. Jews lived here among Poles, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Germans, and others. Bauer investigates the painful question of Jewish actions during the war by studying a handful of selected shtetlach in what was once eastern Poland and is now western Ukraine and western Belarus.

In eastern Poland, occupied by Soviets and then Germans, the issue of Jewish historical responsibility is even more complex than Engel proposes. Here, the Red Army and the NKVD preceded the Wehrmacht and the SS as occupiers. Before the Germans summoned the Jewish councils into existence, the Soviets had recruited some Jews into their local administration. Bauer writes that certain Jewish members of pre-war Communist parties "became prominent in the transition to Soviet rule" after the Red Army invaded eastern Poland in 1939. In the new Soviet economy installed in these lands, "Jews came to occupy a Soviet version of their traditional economic position as a middle class." Although many Jews suffered under the Soviet regime, notes Bauer, it was "popular among the young generation of Jews." Just as the participation of Jewish local elites in the Jewish councils under the Nazis seemed to later scholars to contaminate the history of traditional Jewish communal life, the participation of young Jews in the Soviet regime seemed to corrupt the (also traditional) left-wing Jewish revolt against the authority of prosperous leaders of the Jewish communities. Although the most important Jewish political party in interwar Poland was the religiously Orthodox Agudas Israel, which sought a political accommodation with the Polish authorities, it was challenged on the left by the socialist Bund, various Labor Zionist parties, and the Communist Party (which in eastern Polish towns and cities was heavily Jewish in its membership before the war).

For Hilberg, the tragedy of Jewish history was that Jewish traditions of accommodation precluded resistance to the Germans. For Bauer, by contrast, the tragedy of Jewish society in eastern Poland is that it proved so vulnerable to Soviet coercion and Communist ideology in 1939. Bauer's concern with the integrity of Jewish life perhaps leads him to overstate the significance of Jewish collaboration with Communists. Ukrainians and Belarusians took part in the Soviet administration as well, as did some Poles. Local Jews, though some occupied visible functions as Soviet militiamen and local administrators, were absent from the higher reaches of Soviet administration, which was dominated by Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Russians from further east in the USSR.

Yet when the Germans conquered these lands in the summer of 1941, at the very beginning of their invasion of the Soviet Union, German Einsatzgruppen revealed that the NKVD had murdered thousands of prisoners, and Nazi propaganda blamed the Jews as such for the NKVD executions—which continued until the very moment the Germans arrived. Through emotional, exaggerated, and simplified accounts of these crimes, the Germans sought to inspire local non-Jewish populations to kill Jews.

Goldhagen inverts the Nazi propaganda: rather than all Jews being murderous Communists, all non-Jews are murderous anti-Semites. Thus the "local peoples," says Goldhagen, "as a matter of antisemitic hallucination, conceived of the Jews collectively as Bolsheviks." Most Jews had nothing to do with the Soviet regime, but the association was not a delusion: it was an unfair stereotype, sometimes (according to Bauer's evidence) based on experience, always endorsed by the propaganda of those who now held undisputed power.

Goldhagen himself indulges in exaggeration when he claims that the "local peoples" killed the Jews, thereby "sparing the Germans from doing the job themselves." The pogroms by Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Poles, and others in the summer of 1941 killed some 20,000 people, a horrible total—but less than 2 percent of the final number of victims of the Holocaust in these lands. The Germans, disappointed by what they saw as the failure of "self-cleansing," carried out their next million killings that year by firing squad and gas van. When they did seek assistance, it was usually from released prisoners of war and local policemen under their direct command rather than from anti-Semites acting from emotion. A subtle but grave error here is Goldhagen's use of the general term "peoples," especially since the vast majority of local people took no direct part in the killing of Jews.

Because the focus of Bauer's microhistorical study is so fine, he notices features of the double occupation that make simple explanations of these pogroms harder to sustain. Bauer is the latest of a series of historians, working in different fields, to realize that double occupation means double collaboration. This does not mean that some people collaborated with the Soviets and then other people collaborated with the Germans. It means that many individuals, from all groups, took some part in the institutions of both the Soviet and the German occupier. As Bauer notes, some of the non-Jews who joined the auxiliary police under the Germans had served in the red militias under the Soviets. These local collaborators were important to both Soviet and German policies, first the one, and then the other: but it is hard to square their actions with any prior ideological commitments. Indeed, in some cases people took part in German anti-Semitic policies to distance themselves, in the eyes of their new masters, from their own previous involvement in the Soviet administration.[8]

Bauer regards agreement by Jews to serve in the Jewish Councils in 1941 as the reconstitution, in terrible and unprecedented circumstances, of Jewish communal life. Under his close observation, many clichés collapse. Hilberg's image of a German killing machine is complemented in Bauer's portrait of the dying shtetlach by the portrayal of many individual Jews seeking to preserve elements of Jewish life in an essentially hopeless situation.

Bauer finds that in general the Jews chose their own leaders, who often tried to protect Jewish interests. They usually failed, and were replaced by others chosen by the Germans. In almost every ghetto Jews organized resistance in one form or another: often this was the moral affirmation of Jewish life that Bauer includes in *amidah*. Goldhagen's generalized image of hateful local people also dissolves. Bauer believes (though he does not show) that most non-Jews approved of the Holocaust. Nevertheless, his very fine chapter on "neighbors" reveals the improbable courage some Christians showed in saving Jews. This does not change the general picture of German slaughter and local indifference or hostility to Jews, but it does restore humanity to the millions of people Goldhagen tends to reduce to collective stereotypes. By the end, Bauer has supplied a partial solution to David Engel's

problem. In the Jewish communities he discusses, he has united the history of Jews in the European Jewish homeland with the history of the Holocaust.

Bauer's success is limited chiefly by a problem of sources, one that oddly echoes the criticism of Hilberg that is so important to Engel's account. Hilberg once drew inappropriately categorical conclusions about Jewish life on the basis of German sources. Now Bauer describes the life of Poles (and others) on the basis of Jewish sources. His closing words about Poles recall Hilberg's severe conclusions about Jews: Polish society, says Bauer, "imploded under the weight of its own corruption, economic failure, and uselessness." As Bauer knows, the Polish state collapsed because its leaders chose, as the first Europeans to do so, to resist Hitler. Although some Poles behaved lamentably during the war, Polish underground society was quite developed, and Polish underground resistance formidable. Had Bauer investigated the very same region using Polish-language sources, he would not have been able to claim, as he does, that *amidah*—standing up against danger—is an exclusively Jewish phenomenon. Poles, and others too, practiced various kinds of active defense of their national life, including armed uprisings. Bauer does not see Polish *amidah* because it is not prominent in the Jewish sources he uses—much as Hilberg did not see Jewish *amidah* in the German sources he used.⁹

Bauer's account of Jewish life can thus be read as a summons to a new method, one that might recall both the dignity of the shtetl and the historical integrity of the region. The major homeland of the Jewish people cannot be recalled without its languages. When Hannah Arendt was asked what was left after the murderous self-destruction of Germany, she famously answered: "Es bleibt die Muttersprache"—the German mother tongue remains. What does not remain, after the Holocaust, is the multilingual Europe that produced scholars fully capable of understanding not only Hebrew and Yiddish but also German, Polish, Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian. Research in German sources can recover much of the institutional history of the Holocaust, as Hilberg showed so impressively long ago; and the restoration of Jewish life using Hebrew and German testimonial sources, as Bauer and Friedländer (respectively) demonstrate, can balance his approach by recreating Jewish life in Germany and in the small Jewish towns of the East. The renaissance of Jewish history in Poland, as exemplified by Engelking and Leociak, adds a third element: their research in Polish sources permits a reconstruction of the most important center of Jewish life and Jewish death, the city of Warsaw.

Mutual recognition among the practitioners of these approaches would be a step forward. But the fundamental task is to understand German policies, and Jewish ways of life, in the Eastern European lands where they met, on the basis of primary sources in the relevant languages. They remain, in abundance, many of them scarcely used. "I know that they died," writes Bauer of the Jews of his shtetlach. "I want to know how they lived." Jews lived among others, and their lives, not just their deaths, are incomprehensible without the lives, and sometimes also the deaths, of their non-Jewish neighbors. For that matter, Polish, Ukrainian, and Belarusian were also Jewish mother tongues, and not so very long ago.

Notes

[1] Engel means that prominent Zionist historians preferred to avoid the subject. He does not mean that no Israeli historians wrote about these difficult issues.

[2] For example, Zipperstein's *The Jews of Odessa: A Cultural History, 1794–1881* (Stanford University Press, 1986) and Hyman's *The Emancipation of the Jews of Alsace: Acculturation and Tradition in the Nineteenth Century* (Yale University Press, 1991). In his later work Zipperstein is more willing to countenance the "backshadowing" of the Holocaust onto earlier events than Engel credits: see his *Imagining Russian Jewry: Memory, History, Identity* (University of Washington Press, 1999).

[3] Jews from beyond Poland, most of them from Hungary, were deported to Auschwitz and gassed. Smaller numbers of European Jews were deported to other death factories in occupied Poland and gassed.

[4] See my "Jews, Poles & Nazis: The Terrible History," *The New York Review*, June 24, 2010, and "Nazis, Soviets, Poles, Jews," *The New York Review*, December 3, 2009.

[5] Knopf, 1996.

[6] Goldhagen's analysis fares worse in the Soviet and Chinese Communist cases than it does with the German. In the Communist cases, the threat and application of terror to perpetrators was routine.

[7] Goldhagen claims that Germans were too consistent in their racism to rape Jewish women. Rajchman's memoir is among a considerable number of sources that indicate otherwise.

[8] The idea of such individual self-cleansing was advanced by Jan T. Gross in *Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland* (Princeton University Press, 2001). For examples of double collaboration in recent scholarship, see Anton Weiss-Wendt, *Murder Without Hatred: Estonians and the Holocaust* (Syracuse University Press, 2009), pp. 115–119, and Alexander Brakel, *Unter Rotem Stern und Hakenkreuz: Baranowicze 1939 bis 1944* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2009), p. 304.

[9] In the Yiddish *oyfshtand* and the Polish *powstanie*, as in the Hebrew *amidah*, the notion of "standing up" is equated with resistance and the dignity it endows.

#27

Anti-Anti-Semitism: World Without Nazism is a Kremlin-flavored Anti-Defamation League for the post-Soviet realm – but is it good for Jews?

by Alexander Zaitchik

Tablet —A New Read on Jewish Life, 20 September, 2010

<http://www.tabletmag.com/news-and-politics/45243/anti-anti-semitism/>

[The numerous footnotes were removed. They can be found online –UKL]

Alexander Zaitchik, a writer living in Brooklyn, is the author of Common Nonsense: Glenn Beck and the Triumph of Ignorance.

On a jetlagged June morning in downtown Kiev, I briefly but completely lost my mind.

Three hundred of us had been flown in for the founding conference of a new Moscow-based watchdog organization, World Without Nazism. For the event's kick-off, conference participants gathered in a sun-dappled Vichnoyi Slavy Park, home to the city's Monument of Eternal Glory at the Grave of the Unknown Soldier. We were each handed a red carnation, arranged in parade formation, and led 100 yards toward a massive obelisk memorial. My moment of supreme disorientation occurred just a few steps into the procession, when from behind the bushes came a jolting martial thunder: Previously unseen Brezhnev-era trucks topped with what looked like air-raid sirens had begun blasting the opening chords of "People, Awake!" a 1941 hit from the back catalog of the Red Army Choir. After we reached the obelisk, the very loud Soviet anthem gave way to another, and then another.

"We'll come back with victory!" promised the all-male choir. "The Red Army is the strongest!"

Under this siege of Soviet orchestral swells, I struggled to remember my purpose in Kiev. Was I here for a conference on combating anti-Semitism? Or had I been cast in a shitty remake of Battle at Kursk?

A similar schizophrenia defined the rest of the inaugural conference of World Without Nazism (WWN), a new initiative from the World Congress of Russian Jewry and its president, the Kremlin-connected mini-oligarch Boris Shpigel. On the opening morning of proceedings, the event distinguished itself by becoming what might be the only conference to receive official letters of support from both Hillary Clinton and the autonomous government of South Ossetia. At the podium, speakers spoke of trivialization and denial, though it was not always clear whether they were referring to the Holocaust, or the decisive sacrifice of millions of Red Army soldiers. At the Hotel Prezidente, where the conference was taking place, whores prowled the muzak-cursed lobby as aggressively as they would have 15 years ago.

The most potent symbol of this schizophrenia is also its primary source. While the new organization aspires to global influence and credibility—a kind of Moscow-based Anti-Defamation League that would partner with the European Union and the United Nations—its founding president and public face is a man whose fortunes depend in part on framing Jewish interests to fit the view from the Kremlin.

Boris Shpigel is a bald, round man who looks older than his 57 years and is given to slumping in his seat. He emerged early in the Boris Yeltsin era. Like others who prospered during the 1990s, he anticipated the coming curve and founded the pharmaceuticals firm Biotek shortly before the dissolution of the Soviet Union. By the time Vladimir Putin assumed power, Shpigel had grown his firm from a small research outfit south of Moscow to a major producer dominant in more than 70 markets across the Eurasian expanse. In 2002, he helped found and lead the Party of Russia's Rebirth, a centrist social-democratic party that enjoyed the blessing of Mikhail Gorbachev (and, thought some, the Kremlin, which had been known to fund center-left parties designed to siphon off support from the Communists). By the time Shpigel was elected president of the World Congress of Russian Jewry in 2007, he was a major player at the nexus of business, diplomacy, and culture among Russia, Israel, and the Russian-speaking Jewish Diaspora. Today, as a Duma member, Shpigel sits on committees that handle everything from public institutions to the funding of science, culture, education, and health care.

Concerns over coziness with the Kremlin have dogged WWN's parent organization, the World Congress of Russian Jewry. When it was founded in 2002 as an outgrowth of the Lubavitch-led Federation of Jewish Communities of the CIS, some worried the WCRJ was too intertwined with the Russian government to be an effective advocate. Since assuming the WCRJ presidency, Shpigel has only helped validate these concerns. During Russia's conflict with Georgia over South Ossetia in the summer 2008, Shpigel issued an overheated statement on WCRJ letterhead calling for a tribunal to investigate what he termed acts of "genocide" and "ethnic cleansing" committed by the Georgian military. Though the casual use of such language is anathema to responsible Jewish leadership, Shpigel did not hesitate to echo the Kremlin's bombast. It was left to Shpigel's deputy at the Congress, Israeli Knesset Member Ze'ev Elkin, to dial back the statement. The role of the WCRJ, an exasperated Elkin told Haaretz, is to worry about the well-being of Jews worldwide, not get involved in "geo-political conflicts."

Yet viewed from Moscow, the growth of far-right activity in the former Eastern bloc is hard to disentangle from geo-politics. This is especially true when this activity bubbles up behind NATO lines, embodied by groups espousing anti-Russian and anti-Semitic rhetoric. WWN's early fire has been directed toward the Baltics, where attacks on Soviet war monuments are increasingly accompanied by efforts to celebrate the Nazis (as well as their local collaborators) and edit the history of the Holocaust. In July, WWN's first official statement targeted a decision by Riga's Administrative Court to sanction a public demonstration honoring the Nazi occupation government. WWN was quick and correct to publicize and condemn the decision. But its letter contained a whiff of Kremlin anti-Western boilerplate, blaming EU leniency for the rise of far-right nationalism in the region.

That the European Union has indeed failed to rigorously enforce laws on extremism and denial does not change the fact that the WWN's condemnations, if they are to be taken seriously, must be matched by efforts to shame authorities in Russia itself, which is home to a growing culture of far-right street violence targeting Jews, activists, and, especially, migrant workers from Central Asia. Notably, WWN was silent in late August when 100 skinheads attacked a concert in the central Russian city of Miass, resulting in dozens of injuries and the death of a 14-year-old girl. (The organization did, however, find time in August to issue a statement in opposition to Manhattan's Park51 development, aka the "Ground Zero Mosque.")

One speaker in Kiev publicly addressed these issues and urged the new organization to recognize the historical crimes of communism, even as it challenges official efforts in Eastern Europe to equate and conflate those crimes with those of the Nazis. That speaker was Dovid Katz, a former professor at the University of Vilnius (and Tablet contributor) and the curator of HolocaustInTheBaltics.com. "While we reject the theories of 'equivalence' of Nazi and Soviet crimes," said Katz, "we must be careful never to join those who would deny or mitigate or trivialize the enormous crimes committed by Stalinism and Soviet domination of many lands and peoples against their will."

"It is also very important that our movement has a democratic Western atmosphere," he continued. "It must never be seen to be in any way subservient to today's Russian area politics. We should be meeting in Amsterdam, London, and Paris, not just Kiev, Moscow, and Minsk."

Regardless of where it holds future meetings, and however compromised by Kremlin ties it may be, WWN hardly lacks for urgent work. As the multinational cast of speakers in Kiev made clear, there is a rising "brown tide" in Eastern Europe and throughout the continent. Well-organized neo-fascist political movements are on the march in Hungary and Italy. In the Baltics, monuments to the Holocaust are being removed and the Nazi occupations publicly glorified. Far-right thugs and activists prowl the streets, march on capitals, speak in universities, and organize online, often in flagrant violation of the law.

If World Without Nazism is to join the fight against these developments, it must overcome suspicions that it is little more than just a PR operation for the Russian foreign ministry. Here's hoping that it does.

UKL 451, 29 September 2010

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